Ce mai are de facut reforma in Justitie-scrisoare deschisa in Jurnalul National

Jurnalul National ne face un pustiu de bine publicind in Editia sa de azi urmatoarea scrisoare deschisa a unui judecator decis sa sparga o tacere care ne sperie din cind in cind pe toti. Iat-o mai jos cu tot cu comentariul Jurnalului, care o insoteste:

Am primit ieri, pe mail, o scrisoare deschisa catre ministrul Justitiei. Semnatarul, magistratul Gheorghe Morosanu de la Judecatoria Bicaz, nu s-a adresat presei sa-si rezolve o problema personala, sa se planga de vreo nedreptate ori sa-si parasca sefii. Demersul sau se opreste la semnalarea unor probleme de fond, ce tin de functionalitatea sistemului judiciar. Judecatorul Morosanu face mai curand o analiza a progreselor mecanismului judiciar si arata – cu deferenta, luciditate si umor – componentele perfectibile. Publicam integral continutul epistolei, in speranta ca semnalele autorului vor genera o dezbatere publica, in beneficiul unei cat mai eficiente administrari a Justitiei.(Valentin Zaschievici)

DESPRE CELERITATE. Defectiunile birocratice fac ca procesele sa dureze la nesfarsit, afectand increderea in justitie
TEHNICA. La multe judecatorii din tara, magistratii si grefierii vin cu calculatoarele de acasa
Scrisoare deschisa Excelentei Sale Domnului Cristian Diaconescu Ministrul Justitiei Excelenta,
Aceasta scrisoare nu este un gest de fronda jurnalistica. Ea se vrea o contributie normala, civilizata si constructiva la o discutie despre situatia justitiei romane. Ea nu isi propune nici sa critice, nici sa laude, ci sa expuna realizarile de pana acum si sa prefigureze realizari viitoare.

I. Mai intai, realizari pana in acest moment
Domnule Ministru, nu stiu cat si pentru cate din realizarile ce voi prezenta mai jos aveti o contributie strict personala, dar sigur o contributie aveti, iar istoria le va consemna sub ministeriatul Dumneavoastra. Si le va consemna absolut pozitiv, mai ales ca, daca nu sunt multe, in orice caz sunt esentiale si realizate intr-un timp foarte scurt. Iata-le in conceptia mea:

1. CONSILIUL SUPERIOR AL MAGISTRATURII. Desi eu ma cred un "revolutionar", marturisesc aici ca legea privind Consiliul Superior al Magistraturii mi-a depasit asteptarile. Nu intru in detalii pentru ca legea este cunoscuta. Prin aceasta lege se intra in normal si acest lucru e mai important decat o revolutie.

2. TRANSMITEREA TELEVIZATA A SEDINTELOR CSM. Ei bine, pentru mine asta a fost chiar o revolutie, desi nu este, totusi, decat ceva normal. Pentru ca, daca nu stiti, va comunic eu acum, Legea privind liberul acces la informatiile de interes public a avut in teritoriu efecte inverse: a aparut (si la instanta unde lucrez eu) o lista cu informatii care nu sunt publice. De exemplu, datele privind procedurile de promovare a magistratilor in functii superioare. De ce ar fi acestea secrete? Dupa parerea mea, nu ar fi admisibila nici confidentialitatea veniturilor salariale (in institutiile publice). Poate exagerez eu, as vrea sa-mi explice cineva de ce gresesc. Dar eu stiu ca tot ce nu e public, tot ce se face in spatele usilor inchise poate duce la abuzuri, scapa oricarui control si creeaza un sentiment de insatisfactie, chiar de nesiguranta celor care (implicati sau nu) ar vrea, au chiar dreptul sa stie, ce s-a intamplat intr-o institutie a statului.

La un nivel general, eu nu vad sa existe intr-o societate alte secrete decat cele economice si militare. Cu atat mai mult, intr-o instanta judecatoreasca, totul este public prin lege. Nu este public doar un proces in care o parte interesata a cerut si a obtinut sa fie judecata in sedinta nepublica, numai in interesul acestei parti.

Asadar, in privinta transparentei, semne bune, dar mai este de lucru.

3. COLEGIILE DE CONDUCERE ALE INSTANTELOR. Pas, de asemeni, urias. Am o suma intreaga de semnale despre situatii in care conducerea unipersonala a generat cel putin confuzie, discutii pe la colturi, stres, nemultumiri, daca nu chiar nedreptati si abuzuri. Este logic sa existe un organ colegial alaturi de orice conducator de institutie. E bine ce s-a facut, mai ramane ca, in instante, acest organ sa fie realmente implicat (implicat, nu consultat formal), iar deciziile care ii apartin prin lege sa poarte semnatura tuturor membrilor.

4. ALEGEREA?/NUMIREA? PRESEDINTILOR DE INSTANTE. In ultimele luni am primit pe biroul meu mai multe adrese prin care sunt anuntat ca exista la unele instante posturi vacante de conducere, la care eu pot candida, depunand un dosar avand ca piesa principala un plan de management al instantei. Desi nu am candidat nicaieri, m-am simtit bine, pentru ca mi s-a confirmat o idee (sigur nu e numai a mea), aceea ca toti avem o diploma de drept, nici unul diploma de presedinte.

Pana aici este partea buna a lucrurilor. Dar observati ca in acest subtitlu am pus doua semne de intrebare: alegerea?/numirea? Asta pentru ca eu nu am nici o certitudine ca, in analizarea dosarului trimis de un candidat, nu intervin pe parcurs elemente subiective sau de alta natura.

Solutia acestei probleme, in acceptiunea mea, este una singura: alegerea. Presedintii de instante ar trebui sa fie alesi in adunarea generala a magistratilor, anual. Presedintii, prin definitie, sunt alesi, de la cei de tara pana la cei ai asociatiilor de proprietari. De ce in justitie sa fie altfel?

Alegerea de catre colectiv nu numai ca ar fi cea mai pertinenta, dar ar inlatura si dramele unor presedinti actuali (am exemple la instantele unde am functionat) care au considerat ca simpla punere in discutie a calitatii lor de presedinte, chiar la terminarea mandatului, este un atac la persoana.

5. ADUNARILE GENERALE ALE MAGISTRATILOR EVOCATE MAI SUS FAC DEJA TRECEREA, IN SCRISOAREA MEA, INTRE BILELE ALBE SI CELE GRI. Exista evocate in cateva texte legislative aceste adunari generale. Ei bine, in noua ani de functionare ca judecator, eu nu am fost convocat la nici o astfel de adunare. Si-atunci veti deduce singur, Domnule Ministru, ca aceste adunari nu au intrat in obisnuinta instantelor, deci evident ca nu au forta si competentele pe care ar trebui sa le aiba. Judecatorii nu au nici pe departe constiinta si exercitiul autoritatii lor colective (ca este si din vina lor, asta e o alta poveste).

Deci, aici mai este mult de lucru.

II. Si acum, posibile realizari viitoare

1. BANII MINISTERULUI. Domnule Ministru, orice conducator de institutie (ma refer aici la Ministerul Justitiei, deci la Dumneavoastra) trebuie sa aiba ca grija primordiala situatia financiara, banii cu care administreaza domeniul respectiv. Justitia incaseaza, prin taxele de timbru, sume uriase, cu care s-ar putea gestiona singura, fara probleme. Aceste sume, sub ministeriatul trecut, au fost cedate cu nonsalanta catre primariile locale. Nu intru in detalii pentru ca nu este domeniul meu forte, dar va prezint unele aspecte pe care le intampin personal:
timp de cativa ani, mie mi s-a platit transportul cu masina personala (fac naveta, 2x25 km zilnic); de cateva luni, deplasarea mi se plateste doar la nivelul unui abonament de autobuz, desi eu cheltuiesc pentru transport aceiasi bani. Explicatia contabilitatii tribunalului: nu sunt bani, sunt din ce in ce mai putini bani.
deconturile de medicamente asteapta cu lunile in fisetele aceleiasi contabilitati. Aceeasi explicatie.
discutand cu personalul de la contabilitate mi s-a spus nu numai ca nu sunt bani pentru cele de mai sus, dar ca s-ar putea sa nu mai avem nici pentru abonamente la Monitorul Oficial.
la instanta mea, eu raspund de punctul de documentare. Nu am primit o carte juridica de mai multi ani. Ce ziceti daca as visa la o revista juridica straina?
exista si situatii hazlii, de care ar rade si Pacala: de vreun an de zile avem angajati soferi la toate judecatoriile. Ei leaga dosare la arhiva, fac pe curierii si dau libere paznicilor. De ce? Simplu, pentru ca ni s-au dat soferi, dar nu ni s-au dat masini. Am impresia, Domnule Ministru, ca despre aceasta din urma problema nu v-a informat nimeni, ea datand dinaintea numirii Dvs.
va rog sa remarcati ca nu am scris nimic despre salariile magistratilor, desi de la ultima mea istorica marire de salariu pretul benzinei a crescut de zeci de ori.

2. PREZUMTIA DE VINOVATIE A JUDECATORULUI. a. Pe timpuri, nu stiu care ministru a emis un ordin in sensul ca judecatorii nu au voie sa numeasca expertii cum cred ei, ci numai dintr-o lista de trei, ulterior sase, detasata din lista mare de o functionara a Tribunalului. Asta pentru ca, vezi Doamne, judecatorii ar face o mafie cu unii experti, numindu-i preferential contra unui comision. Nu de mult, in ajutorul acelei functionare a fost adus un program de calculator, care nu-mi permite sa-i numesc pe expertii buni si harnici, pana cand nu dau acelasi numar de lucrari celor mai putin activi sau indispensabili pe moment. Acest cumplit mestesug de tampenie ma pune in imposibilitatea de a numi pe expertii buni si harnici, si la fiecare dosar sunt nevoit sa dau termene peste termene, in timp ce bietul cauzas ma tot intreaba de ce expertiza lui intarzie atat, cand el a platit onorariul cerut.

Resping cu vehementa aceasta nenorocita prezumtie si solicit intrarea urgenta in normalitate, in sensul ca judecatorul sa fie lasat sa lucreze cum crede de cuviinta atata timp cat este calificat, investit si inamovibil.

b. Cat priveste desemnarea aleatorie a completelor de judecata, tot printr-un program de calculator, nu am absolut nici o obiectiune. Dar masura se incadreaza in aceeasi prezumtie inversa de care vorbeam mai sus. Iar computerul folosit pentru aceasta procedura isi putea gasi o intrebuintare mai buna.

c. Intrarile instantelor sunt pline de afise prin care judecatorilor le este interzis sa primeasca in birou orice persoane, inclusiv avocati. Aceeasi prezumtie inversa, ca judecatorul, cu oricine ar discuta, comite un aranjament mafiot Paranteza: ce-ar fi sa interzicem parlamentarilor si guvernantilor sa se vada cu persoanele cu care trebuie sa vina in contact profesional? Dar aceasta problema – a egalitatii si egalitatii de tratament a puterilor in stat – va trebui tratata separat, cu alta ocazie.

Deocamdata, Domnule Ministru, la acest punct vreau sa va spun doua chestiuni:
stiti cate lucruri interesante pentru dosar spune un om daca este ascultat in particular si lasat, stimulat sa spuna ce-l doare cu cuvintele lui? Stiti cat este el de timorat in sedinta publica, acolo unde vrea sa spuna totul dintr-o rasuflare si se incurca in proceduri si termeni juridici? Stiti cat de putin il ajuta avocatii in privinta pregatirii procedurale si psihologice pentru proces?
a existat in anii trecuti o initiativa legislativa in sensul ca baza probatoriului, pregatirea dosarului, sa fie efectuata de avocati, judecatorul urmand a interveni doar in partea finala, necesarmente publica si contradictorie a procesului. Initiativa nu a trecut in parlament, desi ea, sunt convins, ar fi rezolvat 90% din celeritatea actului de justitie – cea mai importanta problema a cauzelor civile. Sper ca ea va fi reiterata cu succes. Judecatorii si avocatii sunt colaboratori in infaptuirea justitiei. Ce credeti cand vedeti in filmele americane ca judecatorul bate cu ciocanelul si spune: Sedinta se suspenda. Avocatii sa vina in biroul meu. Vrea sa le propuna o mafie?

Ei bine, eu, judecatorul Morosanu, va marturisesc aici, cu toate riscurile, ca am rezolvat in acest mod o multime de dosare. Sunt un maestru al impacarii partilor prin tranzactii pe care le-am sugerat si pentru care am insistat cu toata diplomatia si puterea mea de convingere. Si daca partile si-au rezolvat singure litigiul la primul termen, sa-mi spuna cineva ce spaga am incasat eu din asta, in afara zambetului lor de multumire pentru ca ceea ce putea fi calvarul vietii lor a fost doar o scurta discutie omeneasca?

d. Completul colegial, deja legiferat, se inscrie clar in aceeasi prezumtie inversa aplicata judecatorilor. Adica, daca vor fi doi in complet, judecatorii cei necinstiti (exista asa ceva? cati? toti?) se vor controla sau suspecta unul pe altul si aranjamentele vor fi excluse. S-o creada cine vrea. Mafia inseamna cel putin doua persoane, iar spaga s-ar putea dubla. Sa ma ierte colegii mei pentru aceasta gluma proasta (mi-o taxez singur), dar alt rationament nu exista.

Dar daca cele de mai sus sunt supozitii si interpretari, exista o consecinta certa: completul colegial ar insemna dintr-odata dublarea activitatii instantelor, ar trebui dublat numarul magistratilor, al personalului auxiliar, deci si al spatiilor etc.

Este sistemul pregatit sa suporte asa ceva, cand noi nu avem bani nici pentru cheltuieli minore?

3. COMPUTERIZARE – APROAPE ZERO. TREI POVESTI:

a. Acum 11 ani eram jurist la o firma privata din Piatra-Neamt. Intr-o dimineata m-am intalnit la prima ora cu patronul, care tocmai venise din strainatate. Fara sa cheme pe vreunul din salariati s-a instalat la computer si a accesat toate datele de care avea nevoie, de la toate birourile si compartimentele cu privire la vanzari, incasari, litigii etc. Abia dupa aceea a inceput sa-si cheme oamenii, dar nu ca sa-i intrebe ceva, ci ca sa le dea sarcinile ce rezultau din datele accesate.

b. Am mers candva la o judecatorie din judet pentru a cauta o hotarare mai veche ce ma privea personal. Colega de la arhiva, supraaglomerata, isi adusese cei doi fii, care o ajutau la treaba, asa ca i-am cerut sa-mi dea mie registrele ca sa caut singur ce-mi trebuia. Vazand cate ceasloave mi-a adus, am lasat treaba pe a doua zi, cand am venit si eu impreuna cu fiica mea. Aceasta, dupa ce a rasfoit vreo jumatate de ora prin acele registre rupte si unsuroase, deodata s-a oprit si m-a intrebat asa: Tata, dar voi, astia din justitie, sunteti chiar tampiti? Voi nu ati auzit de computere? Domnule Ministru, caut pe cineva sa raspunda la aceasta intrebare a unui copil de 16 ani. Eu nu am putut decat sa dau din umeri.

c. Ca sa fiu drept si exact, la instanta mea exista totusi trei computere: unul la arhiva, unul pentru asociatii si fundatii, al treilea pentru inregistrarea sedintelor penale (apropo: de ce nu si cele civile, care e diferenta?). Nici unul pe masa vreunui judecator sau grefier – deci in lucrul propriu-zis noi suntem tot in epoca lui Voda-Cuza. Dar surpriza: mai exista trei computere: grefiera mea si doi colegi judecatori si-au adus calculatoare de acasa. Deci oamenii vor sa faca pasul inainte, il fac pe cheltuiala proprie, fara nici o pretentie, iar cei abilitati si platiti sa rezolve problema nu au facut deocamdata nimic.

Nu voi considera aceasta problema rezolvata decat atunci cand fiecare judecator si grefier va avea pe masa un computer, legat in retea, cu acces la Internet si e-mail. Eu vreau un laptop.

4. COMPETENTE – FORMALISM EXACERBAT. Judecatorii sunt nevoiti sa se ocupe de tot felul de fleacuri, formalismul este innebunitor, ne mananca timpul si nervii. Pentru investirea unei hotarari cu titlu executoriu suntem nevoiti sa facem o incheiere cu tot tipicul, desi ani de zile simpla rezolutie pe coltul cererii a fost de ajuns.

Pe de alta parte, grefierii sunt mentinuti in aceeasi postura stupida si jenanta de copisti, cand la toate simpozioanele si intalnirile cu magistrati din Europa am aflat ca grefierul european este o adevarata institutie, care are in subordine personal executiv si care hotaraste in problemele minore ale judecatii.

5. LOCUL PROCURORULUI IN PROCESUL PENAL. Nu am scris, conform automatismului de limbaj, "locul si rolul procurorului", ci pur si simplu locul. Chiar in judetul meu, la unele instante, mobilierul salii de judecata este astfel conceput incat locul procurorului este jos, alaturi de avocati, cum e normal sa fie. La instanta mea, procurorul are loc langa mine si intra o data cu mine in sedinta. Intra completul. De aici toata confuzia. Daca mai adaugam si faptul ca uneori procurorul ia conducerea sedintei si face politia sedintei, adica ii aduce la ordine pe avocati, si mai adaugam si faptul ca, la cuvantul final, procurorul vorbeste, iar judecatorul tace, intelegem de ce inca unii justitiabili ni se adreseaza cu formula "domnu’ procuror", de ce altii povestesc dupa sedinta: "M-a condamnat procurorul...".

Sa ne intelegem: eu, ca judecator, as putea hotari foarte usor, intr-o buna zi, sa-l trimit pe procuror langa avocati. Dar nu vreau ca acest gest sa fie tratat ca un afront personal, de aceea n-o fac, pentru ca procurorul este colegul si prietenul meu. Aceasta chestiune trebuie reglementata de sus, pentru toate instantele, urgent. Abia atunci se va rezolva problema egalitatii partilor in procesul penal.

6. DATORIILE MINISTERULUI FATA DE JUDECATORI. Stiti prea bine, exista o gramada de hotarari judecatoresti definitive care obliga ministerul sa ne dea niste bani. Ele nu se executa. Judecatorii au ajuns obsedati de aceste sume, unii sunt in situatii absolut jenante, toti, la orice intalnire colegiala, discuta acelasi lucru: Ne da banii? Cand? Am auzit ca au venit banii in cont, dar se discuta asupra modului de impartire... Mai adaugand si incercarile ministerului de a anula aceste hotarari si lipsa totala de transparenta suntem intr-o situatie absolut jenanta.

Domnule Ministru, va invit sa reflectati si sa sa raspundeti la cele de mai sus. In fond, toate sunt niste mingi aruncate la fileu. Sunt sigur ca aveti capacitatea si vointa de a rezolva toate acestea, chiar intr-un timp scurt. Ati dovedit ca aveti calitatile necesare, iar rezolvarea acestor probleme va poate plasa definitiv in zona pozitiva a istoriei justitiei din Romania.

Cu multa consideratie si incredere, Judecator Gheorghe Morosanu membru AMR – responsabil cu activitatea publicistica si editoriala Judecatoria Bicaz – Neamt E-mail: geo@ambra.ro 0744-14.92.08

CV
Nascut la 21.03.1953, in com. Hangu, jud. Neamt, din parinti munteni.
Stramutat cu casa si familia la Piatra-Neamt, in 1959, in vederea construirii hidrocentralei de la Bicaz.
Liceul "Petru Rares" din P. Neamt, 1972.
Multiple meserii manuale: operator chimist la CFS Savinesti, fierar-betonist la santierul Metrou Bucuresti, sofer la transporturi forestiere – UMTCF P. Neamt. Acestea fiind practicate "cu carte de munca", in particular am exersat si altele: fotograf, croitor, dactilograf (actualmente PC). Am parcurs tara pe bicicleta; si acum pedalez zilnic.
Dupa "universitatile" vietii, la 28 de ani am inceput studiile juridice – Facultatea de Drept a Universitatii Bucuresti, cursuri de zi (1981-1985).
Am lucrat ca jurist, timp de 4 ani, in fosta agricultura cooperatista – UJCAP Suceava si Neamt.
Din dec. 1995 sunt judecator, initial la Judecatoria P. Neamt, apoi la Judecatoria Bicaz. E din toate experientele mele cea mai frumoasa si mai tulburatoare meserie.
Sunt un tip "haios": am fost reclamat la Ministerul Justitiei ca stau cu picioarele pe birou si merg cu bicicleta prin oras, la bustul gol si cu sapca intoarsa.
Sunt sincer si slobod la gura pana la extrem.

Ii multumesc lui Ionut si Andrei care mi-au semnalat-o.

P.S. Putin observa direct modul cum functioneaza alte instante(in mod special administratia care face posibila functionarea optima a judecatorilor) imi dau seama mai bine ce urias "salt" are Romania de facut inainte, si de ce nu este posibil sa fim prea optimisti in privinta acestui "salt". Pe de alta parte, era asteptata cam de multisor o dezbatere in legatura cu "ce este de facut", iar interventia domnului Morosanu este mai mult decit salutara. Felicitari pentru initiativa Domniei sale si sa speram ca reactia care va urma va fi una pozitiva. In definitiv, dupa atitia ani de mizerie, poate avem cu toti dreptul (judecatori, avocati, consilieri-de ce nu, procurori)la o reactie pozitiva.

Noi cazuri CEDO (update) privitoare la Romania

Asa cum am anuntat acum citeva zile, azi CEDO a anuntat mai multe decizii, printre care si una in care este implicata Romania (deciziile nu sint inca finale, dar aceasta nu inseamna ca vor fi modificate), decizie care de altfel era de asteptat sa fie in sensul in care a fost data (o trecem si pe aceasta la capitolul "reusite guvernare".

Ca de obicei, voi reda sub caz comunicatul in engleza al grefei:

1. Croitoru v. Romania (no. 54400/00)
Violare a Articolului 6 § 1; Violare a Articolului 1 al Protocolui No. 1

The applicant, Viorel Croitoru, is a Romanian national, born in 1929 and living in Bucharest.

He complained about the Romanian authorities’ failure to enforce two final judgments in his favour concerning the restitution of land. He relied on Article 6 § 1 (access to court) and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property).

The European Court of Human Rights held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention and awarded the applicant EUR 5,000 for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. (The judgment is available only in English.)

De asemenea, grefa (re)publica in detaliu cazul:

BARBU ANGHELESCU v. ROMANIA(textul integral este disponibil totusi numai in franceza)

The European Court of Human Rights has today(pe 5 Oct) notified in writing a judgment[1] in the case of Barbu Anghelescu v. Romania (application no. 46430/99).

The Court held unanimously:

·that there had been a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (prohibition of degrading treatment); and

·that there had been a violation of Article 3 on account of the lack of an adequate and effective inquiry by the authorities into the treatment complained of.

Under Article 41 of the Convention (just satisfaction), the Court awarded the applicant 7,000 euros (EUR) for non-pecuniary damage.

(The judgment is available only in French.)

1. Principal facts

The applicant, Barbu Anghelescu, is a Romanian national who was born in 1949 and lives in Turcinesti (Romania).

The facts are disputed between the parties.

The applicant asserted that on 15 April 1996 he had been arrested at the wheel of his car after being pulled over by a police patrol. A dispute with the police officers had ensued and one of them, B., had accused him of being “blind drunk”, insulted him, strangled him with his scarf and struck him.

The Romanian Government submitted that the applicant had attempted to evade a measurement of his blood alcohol level and tried to run off. Becoming aggressive, he had caused an altercation in the course of which both he and the police officers had been injured.

Mr Anghelescu was arrested and placed in police custody. Samples were taken at the Târgu-Jiu hospital to determine his blood alcohol level. On the following day criminal proceedings were instituted against him for undermining the authority of a public servant and refusing to provide biological samples, and the public prosecutor remanded him in custody for 30 days. He was released on bail on 25 April 1996.

It appears from a medical report of 17 April 1996 drawn up at the request of the public prosecutor’s office that the applicant had a number of lesions, mainly around the neck. He had three bruises on the left side of his neck, one of which was covered by a graze, three bruises and a graze on the right side of his neck, a graze over his left collar bone and another on his forehead. The report said that these injuries necessitated four to five days’ of medical treatment.

At first instance Mr Anghelescu was sentenced to one year’s imprisonment for undermining the authority of a police officer and a road traffic offence. However, on 18 October 2001 Piteşti Court of Appeal acquitted him after noting that eye-witnesses had given evidence that the applicant had been assaulted by B. and ruling that, given the improper conduct of the police officers, he could not be criticised for trying to get away from them.

In the meantime, in May 1996, Mr Anghelescu had lodged a complaint against the police officers concerned. In January 1998 the Craiova military prosecutor’s office decided to discontinue the proceedings against B. (scoaterea de sub urmărire penală) and found that the other officer had no case to answer. It expressed the view that the police had not intended to assault the applicant but had attempted to prevent him making off. The Timişoara military tribunal upheld an appeal by the applicant against that decision, found that the criminal investigation was incomplete and remitted the case to the Craiova military prosecutor’s office with an indication of the enquiries still to be carried out. After interviewing the accused police officers the military prosecutor’s office discontinued the case against them in September 2002. It appears from the investigation file that no subsequent investigative steps have been taken in the case.

2. Procedure and composition of the Court

The application was lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 11 March 1998 and transmitted to the Court on 1 November 1998. It was declared partly admissible on 2 December 2003.

Judgment was given by a Chamber of 7 judges, composed as follows:

Jean-Paul Costa (French), President,
András Baka (Hungarian),
Loukis Loucaides (Cypriot),
Corneliu Bîrsan (Romanian),
Karel Jungwiert (Czech),
Mindia Ugrekhelidze (Georgian),
Antonella Mularoni (San Marinese), judges,

and also Sally Dollé, Section Registrar.

3. Summary of the judgment[2]

Complaints

Relying on Article 3 of the Convention, the applicant complained of the treatment inflicted by the police at the time of the roadside stop check.

Decision of the Court

The allegation of ill-treatment

The Court noted that Piteşti Court of Appeal had held that the applicant had been assaulted by the police, whose conduct had been improper, and had accordingly acquitted him. On the other hand, the investigations conducted by the military prosecutor’s office against the police officers had led to a radically different conclusion, in that it had ruled that the police officers had not intended to assault the applicant. That finding had been rejected by the Timişoara military tribunal, which asked for additional investigative steps to be taken, but in spite of that no further enquiries had been carried out and the case had been discontinued.

Consequently, the Court could not accept the conclusions set out in the discontinuation order issued by the military prosecutor’s office in September 2002. Having regard to the material in its possession, it considered that the police officers concerned had assaulted the applicant first, although the use of force had not been made necessary by his conduct. It further considered that there was no convincing reason why it should disagree with the findings of the Court of Appeal.

The Court therefore considered that Mr Anghelescu had undergone treatment contrary to Article 3. He had suffered light injuries which had not had serious or lasting after-effects on his health; the facts he had complained of therefore constituted degrading treatment and the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on that account.

The adequacy of the investigations conducted by the Romanian authorities

The Court noted in the first place that there was room for doubt as to the independence of the military prosecutors who had conducted the inquiry in respect of the police officers, in view of the national regulations in force at the material time. They were serving officers, as were the police, and were at the material time part of the military structure based on the principle of hierarchical subordination.

Moreover, the Court was particularly struck by the fact that the military prosecutor’s office had taken no account of the indications given by the Timişoara military tribunal when requesting that it carry out further investigations.

That being so, the Court considered that the Romanian authorities had not conducted a thorough and effective inquiry into the applicant’s allegation that the police officers had inflicted ill-treatment on him. It accordingly concluded that there had been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on that account also.

Fara legatura cu Romania, 2 cazuri interesante din Ucraina care ii vor interesa in mod sigur pe cei care practica dreptul muncii:

Bakay, Leschova, Yemets, Voloshyna, Semak and Lytvynenko v. Ukraine (no. 67647/01)
Violation of Article 6 § 1
Violation of Article 13

Svetlana Naumenko v. Ukraine (no. 41984/98)-(victima a accidentului de la Cernobil/ pensie speciala de asigurari sociale-acordare)
Violations of Article 6 § 1
Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

UE: New cartel procedure

O chestiune care se mai discuta uneori si in Romania, in alti termeni: drepturile de difuzare ale meciurilor. In Germania, pentru a evita ca drepturile de transmisie sa fie vindute unui singur cumparator, ele vor fi impartite in "pachete" de difuzare.. Detalii gasiti mai jos:


Commitments were given by the German Football League (DFL) regarding the marketing of the media rights to German first and second division matches. The revised agreement reached with the DFL is aimed at opening up the joint selling of these rights, particularly in connection with new media, such as UMTS and broadband internet. Under the new system, the broadcasting rights will be sold in a number of separate packages, to avoid that one single broadcaster acquires all the rights. From the start of the 2006/7 season, every match day the League will offer at least 90 minutes live reporting with all highlights on the internet. In addition, from the same season the football clubs will be able to market their home games themselves, and to show their matches live via mobile phones.

As required under Regulation 1/2003, the Commission has published a summary of these commitments in the Official Journal, inviting interested third parties to submit their comments. This is the first public consultation under Regulation 1/2003, and the first time that the Commission proposes to use its powers to make commitments binding (Article 9(1) of Regulation 1/2003).

Source: Case COMP/C2./37.214 – Joint selling of the media rights to the German Bundesliga, Article 27(4) Notice, Official Journal N° C 229, 14.09.2004, p.13.

What is a fair access price to an essential facility?

O intrebare la care va invit sa reflectati, alaturi de colegii nostrii francezi..

In a decision of 22 December 2003, the Competition Council ordered interim measures against NMPP, the leading French press distribution group controlled by Lagardère/Hachette. NMPP was found, prima facie, to have abused its dominant position by preventing MLP, its sole competitor, direct access to the core functionalities of "Presse 2000", a software used by the members of the press distribution network in order to manage and monitor sales of newspapers and magazines, for the benefit of publishers. The Council found that Presse 2000 could be regarded, prima facie, as an essential facility and enjoined NMPP to allow MLP direct access to its core functionalities.

NMPP was also enjoined to inform the Council, within four months, of the measures taken to make such direct access effective. In a new decision dated 22 July 2004, the Competition Council examined whether the measures taken by NMPP were sufficient and adequate and, in particular, whether the access price proposed by NMPP met the "fair economic terms" condition.

NMPP argued among other things that the price of access to an essential facility does not automatically have to be cost oriented. According to NMPP, the access charge should take into account the loss that it will inevitably suffer due to the direct access to its software enjoyed by MLP (the opportunity cost). Accordingly, in order to set the price for direct access, NMPP estimated the value of the economic transfer in favour of its competitor that would result from the implementation of the interim measure.

The Competition Council rejected NMPP's arguments. It held that on an uncompetitive market such as the French press distribution market, which is dominated by NMPP, the owner of an essential facility cannot charge its competitors an access price equal to the loss suffered because of the access. Indeed, in such a market environment, the dominant undertaking cannot legitimately claim to recover the loss suffered as the ex-ante revenues which it is alleged will be lost are largely the result of monopoly profits. To validate such an approach would allow the dominant undertaking to maintain a high level of prices.

Source: http://www.conseil-concurrence.fr/pdf/avis/04d34.pdf.

Regime change?...

Desigur, nu e vorba despre Irak, ci despre Romania, pe care the Economist o descrie destul de bine mai jos (Ziua ne face un pustiu de bine traducind cele cu pricina)

O schimbare de guvern ar putea fi sanatoasa"- se scrie despre Romania in saptamanalul britanic "The Economist", citat de postul de Radio Europa Libera si preluat de RADOR, cu adaugirea: "Social-democratii, aflati la guvernare, sunt post-comunisti ai caror lideri mai in varsta au facut scoala in vremea lui Ceausescu. Ei si-au modernizat stilul si ideile in ultimii patru ani, dar masina partidului este alimentata cu clientelism si coruptie". "Principala grupare de opozitie - continua articolul din "The Economist" - "Dreptate si Adevar" este ceva mai libera de asemenea pacate, dar instinctele ei sunt mai liberale. O schimbare de guvern nu ar insemna o mare modificare de politica. Cele mai multe decizii vor fi dictate de angajamentele asumate deja de Romania fata de UE, NATO si FMI". Si articolul atrage atentia ceva mai departe: "Mai e inca o cale lunga. Romania are venitul cel mai mic pe cap de locuitor, in Europa Centrala, standardele ecologice cele mai rele, cele mai mari arierate pe planul impozitelor, coruptia cea mai invadatoare, cea mai crescuta mortalitate infantila si cheltuielile cele mai reduse de invatamant. Sistemul juridic este o jale, libertarea presei discutabila, iar piata muncii atat de disfunctionala, incat constituie un factor paralizant pe plan uman, dupa expresia unui raport al Bancii Mondiale". (A.H.)

Circul ideilor...continuare, azi citeva "jurnale" ale profesorilor

Dupa cum spune "Papa" Dick Posner in articolul sau(merita o lectura acest articol..., iata mai jos citeva idei,diferite de cea de mai sus pe care cei interesati o vor gasi in articol, pe care din pacate nu am timp sa le traduc...

Most articles by law professors today are still, as they were a century ago, rather narrowly, conventionally doctrinal. Typically, they criticize a key case or lines of cases as inconsistent with doctrine emerging from other cases. Good law students can evaluate and improve such articles today as always. But—and this is true not only at the leading law schools—many law faculty today have, for good or ill, broken the doctrinal mold.

Their work now draws very heavily on sources other than legal doctrine, whether it is economics, history, political or moral philosophy, psychology, statistics, epistemology, anthropology, linguistics—even literary theory. The use of insights from these fields in analyzing law has given rise in recent decades to a cornucopia of interdisciplinary fields of legal studies ("law and . . . " fields), ranging from law and economics (the largest and most influential) to feminist jurisprudence and critical race theory.

), unul dintre locurile interesante in care gaseste teoria dreptului in revistele americane sint "jurnalele" editate de profesori (printre care putem include working paper series, ca laborator de idei). Iata mai jos citeva dintre ele (ii sint indatorat lui Aaron S. Edlin, editorul bepress-ului, care le anunta), din care am selectat posibile articole de interes pentru juristii romani.


The University of Virginia John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper Series

EDITOR: George G. Triantis, Perre Brown Professor of Law,
University of Virginia School of Law

Anup Malani and Albert Choi, "Are Non-Profit Firms Simply
For-Profits in Disguise? Evidence from Executive
Compensation in the Nursing Home Industry" (August 2,
2004). University of Virginia Legal Working Paper Series.
University of Virginia John M. Olin Program in Law and
Economics Working Paper Series

ABSTRACT:

It is relatively well-established that there are
differences between executive compensation at for-profit
and non-profit firms. In particular, the latter employ
performance bonuses with much lower frequency than the
former. The question this paper addresses is: do these
differences imply that for-profit and non-profit firms have
different objectives? Do non-profit care about, e.g.,
quality or quantity of production, rather than profits?
This paper answers in the negative. Observed differences in
wage contracts can be explained by the fact that non-profit
firms operate in a different regulatory environment than
for-profits. In particular, IRS regulations discourage
non-profit firms from using performance incentives on pain
of paying tax penalties and perhaps losing their tax-exempt
status. A non-profit firm which seeks to maximize profits
would respond to this constraint by substituting away from
performance bonuses (carrots) towards incentives based on
the risk of firing (sticks). The result will be higher base
salary, to compensate risk-averse executives for the use of
as blunt an instrument as firing, and a higher overall
salary, because non-profits have a smaller set of feasible
contracts from which to choose. We test these predictions
on a unique, facility-level data set of executive
compensation at 2700 nursing homes in 2001 and 2002. Not
only do we find support for our predictions, but we also
find that compensation rises with profits, but not with
quality or quantity. This last result is notable because it
demonstrates that the tax-regulation explanation for
non-profit executive compensation is not only more
parsimonious, but likely more accurate than the
different-objectives explanation.

Eric A. Posner, Alexander Triantis, and George G. Triantis,
"Investing in Human Capital: The Efficiency of Covenants
Not to Compete" (October 13, 2004). University of Virginia
Legal Working Paper Series. University of Virginia John M.
Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper Series

ABSTRACT:

Covenants not to compete (CNCs) are used in employment
contracts to prevent employees from working for other
employers. The legal enforcement of CNCs varies across
jurisdictions in the U.S.: some states ban them (notably,
California) while a majority of other states enforce CNCs
when they reasonably protect a legitimate interest of the
employer. The discrepancy in the legal policy regarding
CNCs is reflected in an academic debate over the economic
efficiency of these covenants. One side argues that CNCs
are bad because they restrict labor mobility; the other
side argues that the restriction on the movement of workers
is good because it prevents workers from appropriating
their employers' human capital investments (and CNCs
thereby encourage such investment). This paper addresses
together the two objectives of ex post (labor mobility) and
ex ante (human capital investment) efficiency. It compares
CNCs with the alternative contract breach remedies of
specific performance and liquidated damages. A given CNC
may be analyzed as a hybrid that adopts specific
performance with respect to attempted movements to
employers within its scope and liquidated damages equal to
zero with respect to movements outside its scope. Among the
results of the paper is the finding that, where a CNC can
be renegotiated, first-best performance and first-best
investment can be induced. The appropriate choice of the
CNC scope can balance perfectly the overinvestment tendency
of specific performance against the underinvestment effect
caused by zero liquidated damages. Contracting parties,
however, have the incentive to agree to excessively broad
CNCs that enable them to extract rents from prospective new
employers within the CNC scope. The law should be wary of
this incentive in policing CNCs.

........
Paul G. Mahoney, Guolin Jiang, and Jianping Mei, "Market
Manipulation: A Comprehensive Study of Stock Pools"
(October 13, 2004). University of Virginia Legal Working
Paper Series. University of Virginia John M. Olin Program
in Law and Economics Working Paper Series

ABSTRACT:

Using a hand collected new data set, this paper examines
in detail a classic account of stock market manipulationthe
"stock pools" of the 1920s, which prompted the current
anti-manipulation rules in the United States. We find
abnormal trading volume during pools, consistent with
market manipulation, but this trading led to only modest
average price increases in the short run and no abnormal
performance in the long run. Thus, there is no evidence
that the stock pools harmed small investors. Given
investigators' efforts to find cases of manipulation on the
New York Stock Exchange during the 1920s, these findings
suggest that manipulation was not a substantial problem.

Paul G. Mahoney and Chris W. Sanchirico, "General and
Specific Legal Rules" (October 13, 2004). University of
Virginia Legal Working Paper Series./University of Virginia
John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper
Series

ABSTRACT:

Legal rules may be general (that is, applicable to a broad
range of situations) or specific. Adopting a custom-tailored
rule for a specific activity permits the regulator to make
efficient use of information about the social costs and
benefits of that activity. However, the rule maker typically
relies on the regulated parties for such information. The
regulated parties may attempt to influence the rule maker,
producing rules that reflect their private interests. We
show that in some cases limiting the rule maker to a single
rule for multiple activities will moderate this influence
and maximize welfare.

Paul G. Mahoney and Daniel M. Klerman, "The Value of
Judicial Independence: Evidence from 18th Century England"
(October 13, 2004). University of Virginia Legal Working
Paper Series/ University of Virginia John M. Olin Program
in Law and Economics Working Paper Series

ABSTRACT:

This paper assesses the impact of judicial independence on
equity markets. North and Weingast (1989) argue that
judicial independence and other institutional changes
inaugurated by the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 allowed
the English government credibly to commit to repay
sovereign debt and more generally to protect contractual
and property rights. Although they provide some supporting
empirical evidence, they do not investigate the effect of
judicial independence separately from that of other
institutional innovations. This paper is the first to
attempt to do so. We look at share price movements at
critical points in the passage of the 1701 Act of
Settlement and other events which gave judges greater
security of tenure and higher salaries. Our results suggest
that giving judges tenure during good behavior had a large
and statistically significant positive impact on share
prices, while salary increases and other improvements to
judicial independence had positive but generally
insignificant impacts.

The Columbia Public Law & Legal Theory Working Papers,

EDITOR: Michael Dorf, Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law

William H. Simon, "Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity:Lawyer Responsibility for Collective Misconduct" (October
7, 2004). Columbia Law School. Columbia Public Law & Legal
Theory Working Papers

ABSTRACT:

Deliberate ignorance and calculated ambiguity are key recurring themes in modern scandals from Watergate to
Enron. Actors, especially lawyers, seek to limit
responsibility by avoiding knowledge and clear
articulation. This essay considers this phenomenon from the point of view of both business organization and legal
doctrine. Evasive ignorance and ambiguity seem endemic to a
particular organizational model and to a traditional model
of legal responsibility. Developments in both law and
business, however, suggest that these models are being
superceded. Many of the most dynamic businesses now
emphasize practices of "transparency" designed to inhibit
evasive ignorance and calculated ambiguity. A major trend
in recent legal doctrine, strikingly exemplified by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, is to strengthen duties of inquiry and
clear articulation. The legal profession, however, has
strongly resisted these trends with respect to its own
regulation. The essay argues that the bar's opposition to
many of the lawyer regulation initiatives under
Sarbanes-Oxley reflects a misguided attachment to the
privileges of non-accountability associated with deliberate
ignorance and calculated ambiguity.

William H. Simon, "Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and
Rolling Rule Regimes" (October 7, 2004). Columbia Law
School. Columbia Public Law & Legal Theory Working Papers

ABSTRACT:

The engineering ideas associated with the Toyota Production
System form a model of social organization that departs
from bedrock assumptions of mainstream legal thought in
both its rights-and-principles and law-and-economics
variants.
In contrast to mainstream thought, the Toyota system (1)
emphasizes the goals of learning and innovation (rather
than of dispute resolution and the vindication of
established norms and preferences), (2) combines the
normative explicitness associated with formal rules with
the continuous adjustment to particularity associated with
informal norms (no dialectic of rules and standards), (3)
treats normative decisionmaking in hard cases as
presumptively collective and interdisciplinary (rather than
the heroic labor of a solitary professional), (4) fosters a
style of reasoning that is intentionally destabilizing of
settled practices (rather than harmonizing or optimizing),
and (5) attempts to bracket or sublimate issues of
individual and retrospective fairness.
The Toyota perspective is potentially important to lawyers
because it is an exceptionally elaborated version of ideas
that have, with varying degrees of coherence and
articulateness, influenced some emergent legal regimes. The
paper traces Toyota themes in recent American developments
in health and safety regulation and in the delivery of
social services.

........
Michael C. Dorf, "Putting the Democracy in Democracy and
Distrust: The Coherentist Case for Representation
Reinforcement" (October 7, 2004). Columbia Law School/
Columbia Public Law & Legal Theory Working Papers

ABSTRACT:

Nearly a quarter of a century after its publication,
Democracy and Distrust remains the single most perceptive
justificatory account of the work of the Warren Court and
modern constitutional law more broadly. Yet, the continuing
influence of John Hart Ely's process theory of American
constitutional law may seem surprising, given that the
account has been incisively criticized as both too limited
and too sweeping. Beginning with Laurence Tribe's "Puzzling
Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories" and
culminating in the work of Ronald Dworkin and others,
critics have argued that the representation-reinforcing
approach to interpreting the Constitution is no less laden
with controversial value judgments than other, more openly
substantive methods, and that therefore, judicial review
ought not to be restricted in the way that Ely thought it
should be. From the other side, those that Ely called
"interpretivists" have invoked (more or less) the same set
of arguments as a basis for concluding that the
Constitution's open-ended provisions should be given
neither substantive nor procedural content apart from what
is narrowly entailed by the original understanding of its
framers and ratifiers.
In light of these mirroring critiques, what accounts for
the staying power of Democracy and Distrust? The answer, to
which Ely himself points in the opening pages of the book,
is the popularity of democracy. "We have as a society from
the beginning," he writes, "and now almost instinctively,
accepted the notion that a representative democracy must be
our form of government." By making
more-or-less-majoritarian democracy the centerpiece of his
account of judicial review, Ely trades on this deeply
rooted instinct. Throughout Democracy and Distrust, he
invokes "the basic democratic theory of our government" as
the standard against which an approach to judicial review
should be measured.

Jeffrey A. Fagan and Valerie West, "The Decline Of The
Juvenile Death Penalty: Scientific Evidence Of Evolving
Norms" (August 23, 2004). Columbia Law School/Columbia
Public Law & Legal Theory Working Papers

ABSTRACT:

In 2003, the Missouri Supreme Court set aside the death
sentence of Christopher Simmons, who was 17 when he was
arrested for the murder of Shirley Crook. The Simmons court
held that the "evolving standards of decency" embodied in
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments barred execution of persons who committed
capital crimes before their 18th birthday. This decision
was based in part on the emerging legislative consensus in
the states opposing execution of juvenile offenders and the
infrequency with which the death penalty is imposed on
juvenile offenders. The State sought a writ of certiorari,
and the case is now before the U.S. Supreme Court. This
article presents results of analyses of empirical data on
the use of the death penalty for adolescent homicide
offenders in state courts in the U.S. since 1990. The data
show that, since 1994, when death sentences for juvenile
offenders peaked, juvenile death sentences have declined
significantly. In particular, the decline in juvenile death
sentences since 1999 is statistically significant after
controlling for the murder rate, the juvenile homicide
arrest rate, and the rate of adult death sentences. This
downward trend in juvenile death sentences signals that
there is an evolving standard in state trial courts
opposing the imposition of death sentences on minors who
commit capital offenses.

The University of San Diego Law and Economics
Research Paper Series

PUBLISHER: The Berkeley Electronic Press
EDITOR: Daniel B. Rodriguez, Dean and Professor of Law,
University of San Diego School of Law

ABSTRACTS:

Shaun Martin and Frank Partnoy, "Encumbered Shares"
(October 27, 2004). University of San Diego Legal Working
Paper Series/University of San Diego Law and Economics
Research Paper Series.

ABSTRACT:

The fundamental assumptions in the law and economics
literature about shareholder voting and the
one-share/one-vote rule are flawed. The classic view is
that share ownership is necessary and sufficient to create
voting rights and that such rights should be directly
proportional to share ownership. We demonstrate that this
assumption is unfounded, both for shares that are
"economically encumbered" (held by shareholders who are not
pure residual claimants; e.g., a shareholder who owns one
share and is also short one or more shares) as well as
shares that are "legally encumbered" (held or associated
with more than one shareholder; e.g., shares that are
loaned to a short, who sells that share to another buyer).
The one-share/one-vote rule is not only economically
suboptimal, but results in substantial deleterious
consequences. Quorum and regulatory requirements are
distorted; mergers and acquisitions are too easily
approved; securities class actions are undervalued and
simultaneously under- and over-compensate; bankruptcy
distributions are over- and under-inclusive; and
fixed-ratio stock offers are preferred over economically
superior alternatives. These results all derive from an
unfounded reliance upon the one-share/one-vote principle
and the belief that even economically or legally encumbered
shares are entitled to vote.

Frank Partnoy, "Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply
to Professor Coffee" (October 27, 2004). University of San
Diego Legal Working Paper Series/University of San Diego
Law and Economics Research Paper Series

ABSTRACT:

This article responds to a proposal by Professor John C.
Coffee, Jr. for a modified form of strict liability for
gatekeepers. Professor Coffee's proposal would convert
gatekeepers into insurers, but cap their insurance
obligations based on a multiple of the highest annual
revenues the gatekeepers recently had received from their
wrongdoing clients. My proposal, advanced in 2001, would
allow gatekeepers to contract for a percentage of issuer
damages, after settlement or judgment, subject to a
legislatively-imposed floor. This article compares the
proposals and concludes that a contractual system based on
a percentage of the issuer's liability would be preferable
to a regulatory system with caps based on a multiple of
gatekeeper revenues.
Both proposals mark a shift in the scholarship addressing
the problem of gatekeeper liability. Until recently,
scholarship on gatekeepers had focused on reputation not
regulation or civil liability as the key limitation on
gatekeeper behavior. Indeed, many scholars have argued that
liability should not be imposed on gatekeepers in various
contexts, and that reputation-related incentives alone
would lead gatekeepers to screen against fraudulent
transactions and improper disclosure in an optimal way,
even in the absence of liability. From a theoretical
perspective, this article is an attempt to move the
literature away from a focus on reputation to an assessment
of a potential reinsurance market for securities risks,
where gatekeepers would behave more like insurers than
reputational intermediaries.

Lester B. Snyder, "Does the Tax Law Discriminate Against
the Majority of American Children: The Downside of Our
Progressive Rate Structure and Unbalanced Incentives for
Higher Education?" (October 25, 2004). University of San
Diego Legal Working Paper Series/University of San Diego
Law and Economics Research Paper Series

ABSTRACT:

Our graduate income tax structure provides an incentive to
shift income to lower-bracket family members. However, some
parents have much more latitude to shift income to their
children than do others. Income derived from services and
private business-by far the majority of American income-is
less favored than income derived from publicly traded
securities. The rationale given for this discrimination is
that parents in services or private business, as opposed to
those in securities, do not actually part with control of
their property. This article explores these tax broader
(yet subtle) tax benefits and their impact on the majority
of children seeking a higher education. Proposed solutions
to this lack of uniformity are discussed.

Karen C. Burke and Grayson M.P. McCouch, "Estate Tax Repeal
and the Budget Process" (October 25, 2004). University of
San Diego Legal Working Paper Series/University of San
Diego Law and Economics Research Paper Series

ABSTRACT:

This article examines the Bush Administration's proposal,
as part of its proposed fiscal year 2005 budget, to extend
permanently the repeal of the federal estate tax. The
article considers the budgetary impact of permanent estate
tax repeal and discusses procedural impediments to use of
the reconciliation process for permanent tax cuts. The
article also notes the possibility of a durable compromise
solution involving retention of the estate tax with lower
rates and a higher exemption.

Karl M. Manheim and Lawrence B. Solum, "An Economic
Analysis of Domain Name Policy" (March 1, 2004). University
of San Diego Legal Working Paper Series/University of San
Diego Law and Economics Research Paper Series

ABSTRACT:

One of the most important features of the architecture of
the Internet is the Domain Name System (DNS), which is
administered by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN). Logically, the DNS is organized into
Top Level Domains (such as .com), Second Level Domains
(such as amazon.com), and third, fourth, and higher level
domains (such as www.amazon.com). The physically
infrastructure of the DNS consists of name servers,
including the Root Server System which provides the
information that directs name queries for each Top Level
Domain to the appropriate server. ICANN is responsible for
the allocation of the root and the creation or reallocation
of Top Level Domains.
The Root Server System and associated name space are scarce
resources in the economic sense. The root servers have a
finite capacity and expansion of the system is costly. The
name space is scarce, because each string (or set of
characters) can only be allocated to one Registry (or
operator of a Top Level Domain). In addition, name service
is not a public good in the economic sense, because it is
possible to exclude strings from the DNS and because the
allocation of a string to one firm results in the inability
of other firms to use that name string. From the economic
perspective, therefore, the question arises: what is the
most efficient method for allocating the root resource?
There are only five basic options available for allocation
of the root. (1) a static root, equivalent to a decision to
waste the currently unallocated capacity; (2) public
interest hearings (or beauty contests); (3) lotteries; (4)
a queuing mechanism; or (5) an auction. The fundamental
economic question about the Domain Name System is which of
these provides the most efficient mechanism for allocating
the root resource?
This resource allocation problem is analogous to problems
raised in the telecommunications sector, where the Federal
Communications Commission has a long history of attempting
to allocate broadcast spectrum and the telephone number
space. This experience reveals that a case-by-case
allocation on the basis of ad hoc judgments about the
public interest is doomed to failure, and that auctions (as
opposed to lotteries or queues) provide the best mechanism
for insuring that such public-trust resources find their
highest and best use.
Based on the telecommunications experience, the best method
for ICANN to allocate new Top Level Domains would be to
conduct an auction. Many auction designs are possible. One
proposal is to auction a fixed number of new Top Level
Domain slots each year. This proposal would both expand the
root resource at a reasonable pace and insure that the
slots went to their highest and best use. Public interest
Top Level Domains could be allocated by another mechanism
such as a lottery and their costs to ICANN could be
subsidized by the proceeds of the auction.

Despre experienta exilului la romani ...

In romstudyabroad,plecind de la o discutie despre "teapa" sau "neteapa" burselor oferite de guvernoiu cu conditia sa te intorci (de ce sa te mai si intorci daca tot ai luat bursa aia, zic unii dintre tinerii nostri crescuti sub le nouveau ancien regime cum i-ar spune Toqueville) ca slujbas in administratie au aparut doua mesaje interesante despre experienta romaneasca a exilului, pe care imi permit sa le redau mai jos (fiind vorba, dupa capul meu de un soi de altfel de experienta decit cea a agriculturilor, constructorilor si prostituatelor cu care ne rasfata presa romana si unii compatrioti).

Daca unii se intreaba cum pot exista romani fericiti in afara
granitzelor...Iata o explicatie a unui roman fericit:

"Intereseaza pe cineva de ce-am plecat? Intereseaza pe cineva de ce nu ma intorc in Romania? Vi se pare ca rid prea mult de Romania? Vi se pare ca de la distanta care ne separa ma doare in cot de Romania si de cei ce traiesc/se bucura/iubesc/sint dezamagiti/supravietuiesc acolo?

Ei bine... iubesc Romania si ma doare ca nu sint acolo (nu pot sa zic ca sufar, asta nu). Am stat acolo 6 ani dupa ce-am terminat facultatea, platind taxe imense dupa salarul meu "bun" si sperind ca indreptarea va incepe, sperind ca ceva va incepe sa mearga bine, sperind ca o sa apara acel "ceva". Acel domeniu pe care sa poti pune degetul si sa spui - 'da, asta va trage Romania inainte', acel ceva,
orice - industria petroliera, IT, industria lemnului, turismul, orice cu care sa pot sa ridic capul in lume sa zic "sint din Romania" si sa mi se raspunda "aaa, stiu, "AIA", asa cum daca zici IKEA zici Suedia, asa cum daca zici Microsoft zici SUA, asa cum daca zici Sony zici Japonia, asa cum daca zici Nokia...

Mai mult insa decit iubirea mea pentru Romania este dragostea pentru familia mea si pentru sanatatea mea mentala. Dupa 6 ani am obosit, da asta e cuvintul, am obosit sa astept acel ceva si am plecat - vad acum ca inca n-a aparut si nici nu sint nici un fel de semne c-ar apare (in afara de optimismul nejustificat si nebunesc al lui al unora care scriu pe diferite forumuri cu sau fara diasporeni sau de cuvintarile gaunoase ale Partidului).

Iubesc Romania si ma prinde citeodata dorul si melancolia si mi-e CIUDA de mor ca nu pot trai acolo pentru ca nu pot sa suport hachitele zilnice ale mai stiu eu cui care nu-si face treaba deloc sau nu asa cum ar trebui, ale mai stiu eu cui care te priveste usor ironic-cinic-milog cu gindul la cafeaua, ciocolata sau plicul dosite prin buzunare "in caz ca". Iubesc Romania asa cum iubesti un copil rau si neastimparat dar frumusel si inteligent, insa murdar si
inconstient. Imi place sa intilnesc acest copil dar ma oboseste sa vad cum el ramine tot timpul in clasa I-a in timp ce alte si alte generatii cresc si-i fac cu mina de la etajul claselor superioare.

Iubesc Romania si de aia o sa gasiti tonul asta la mine, aici sau pe 'bilci', sau pe 'asociatia de blocatari', tocmai pentru ca-mi pasa. Si poate, mai departe decit tonul declarativ al comparatiilor Romania-Germania, Romania-Danemarca, Romania-[puneti voi ceva aici] pe care le citesc pe aici si pe dincolo eu incerc sa ma uit obiectiv/realist la Romania, incerc sa aduc in fata ce nu merge bine, ce poate fi corectat sau imbunatatit. Atita timp cit acel "ceva"
mentionat mai sus nu exista (si nu ma imbat cu surogate gen olimpicii nostri sau spitale stralucitoare de la televizor) o sa continui sa fac asta si o sa continui sa iubesc Romania, "cu mila si dulce durere".

Caragiale a ris; eu nu pot, eu doar sufar, citeodata cu cinism, altadata cu speranta, altadata cu un zimbet in coltul gurii dar in majoritatea timpului fara nici o speranta. Realist vorbind."

Textul complet il gasiti pe www.troniu.dk.

Alex


--- In romstudyabroad@yahoogroups.com, OVI wrote:


Va scriu pe scurt din Atena unde ma gasesc de mai bine
de 7 ani. Am facut la inceput anul pregatitor de limba
greaca,apoi am urmat cusursurile Facultatii de Litere
- Sectia - Engleza Greaca, am absolvit-o si apoi am
facut un masterat in Stiinte Politice,ceva axat pe
tema "Studii Sud Est Europene".Pana la masterat am
avut o bursa primita de Onbss, dar fara a fi obligat
sa ma intorc, dupa ce am primit eu aceasta bursa
undeva prin '98 sau '99 am inteles ca toti aplicantii
erau obligati sa semneze cu un girant ca se vor
intoarce inapoi.
Am vazut si eu situl burseguvern.ro
si chiar ma gandisem sa aplic pt ca voi incepe aici la
Atena un doctorat in Geo politica.Inca nu sunt sigur
daca voi aplica sau nu, dar cred ca nu este o teapa
chiar daca suntem in plina campanie electorala.
Atata timp cat am fost burisier la Atena, chair daca
banii au fost putini 380 euro/luna, iar la masterat nu
am fost burisier, am muncit ca sa ma intretin,totul a
fost binisor ca si bursier, apoi a trebuit sa muncesc
si am inteles mai bine pe toti acesti romani care
veneau zilnic in Grecia la munca, ii intelegeam can
imi povestaeu cat de urat se comportau patronii cu ei,
multi dintre ei chair din aceasta cauza sau si intors
acasa, cat de neseriosi erau patronii cu ei ,cat de
putin ii plateau pt munca prestata comparativ cu
municitorul grec, cat de greu le era sa se legalizeze
cu oficialitatile.....
La fel si mie imi este greu,ca sa muncesc ceea ce am
studiat nu pot pt ca nu sunt cetatean european,nu am
diferite drepturi aici pe acelasi motiv,la orice usa
bat uneori mi se inchide pe motiv ca vin din Europa de
Est si nu am incredere in mine....Exact pe acest motiv cred ca este mai BINE SA MA INTORC IN TARA MEA,
exemple aici in Grecia sunt multe, am fost Erasmus si
in Portugalia si nu pot spune aca a fost mai bine, am
locuit si la Londra 4 luni si a fost la fel, atunci
care ar fi motivul sa stau aici, sa ma simt tot timpul
un nimic......
Sper ca acest mesaj sa il luati in considerare doar ca
pe o proprie experienta......
Ovidiu