Friday, November 19, 2004

The dangers of a contradictory constitution

La cele scrise de Liviu mai jos, adaug si eu un articol al profesorului Richard Epstein.[ pentru detalii despre biografia sa:


By Richard Epstein
Financial Times (London, England)
October 11, 2004

Appearances can often deceive. On the face of it, the proposed European Union constitution imitates the American federalist form. But its specific provisions move in an entirely different direction.

First, American federalism forged a unified front against the rest of the world. The president as commander-in-chief presided over a national army and had the power to call state militias into federal service. The states were barred from entering "into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation", thereby ceding the federal government monopoly power over foreign relations.

Next, the economic front. The American constitution moved towards a national free-trade zone by prohibiting all taxes on imports or exports except when "absolutely necessary" for executing inspection laws. States were barred from coining money, so a national currency became the norm. Yet the protectionist impulse was not entirely squashed, for the power to regulate foreign commerce allowed Congress to impose a uniform tariff wall against the world. Its power to regulate commerce among the states could also be used to create domestic cartels in navigation and transportation.

Despite the uncertain direction of its structural provisions, the American constitution did contain strong classical liberal guarantees that protected life, liberty and property from government regulation and taxation. Supreme Court case law largely tracked sound principles of political economy: protect competition both among individuals and between states; constrain monopoly; control common problems for wildlife and natural resources; and control force and nuisances. But the justices of the 1937 New Deal rejected that focused vision, and their ill-founded belief in large government simultaneously expanded federal power and constricted individual rights.

American history illustrates how even mostly sound constitutional structures can fall prey to political pressures and intellectual fads. That lesson counsels all defenders of market institutions, both in Britain and elsewhere in the EU, to oppose adoption of an EU constitution flawed at its inception. First, no EU constitution could deliver one big benefit of the US model: a unified defence force. Rather, current jealousies and foreign policy differences invert EU federalism, by allowing nation-states to conduct independent foreign policies and military operations. So a new constitution could only help with social and economic affairs. But the proposals enshrine principles that can only work to perpetuate the EU's economic malaise and lead to unwise social legislation.

Its root difficulty lies in solidifying the worst aspects of the status quo by trying to serve the causes of freedom and regulation simultaneously. It voices a deeply felt commitment to open borders and free movement of capital and labour within the Union. But it also embraces "the sustainable development of the earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and protection of human rights". It then extols "growth, price stability, social progress, full employment, balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress".

This infinitude of ends means no nation can know what it signs up to. Some deep conflicts occur. Free trade allows each nation to buy and sell goods across borders. But "fair" trade invites a prohibition against trading with nations that fail to adopt the right minimum standards for workers and the environment. The same provision could either open markets or slam them shut. Requiring that trading partners lavish resources on their environments promotes "sustainable development", while wage and price controls promote price stability. Yet both stifle competition from poorer nations.

Unfortunately, ducking hard choices today invites larger conflict tomorrow. Britain and other EU member states should steer clear of a constitution that promises little benefit and much hardship. The alternative is to push hard for a comprehensive free-trade agreement that avoids the risk of oppressive centralised regulation and exerts pressure for the EU to liberalise its own internal markets. But do not make the foolish bet that the EU's byzantine political processes will cleanse its cluttered and flawed constitution.

The writer is professor of law at the University of Chicago and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is giving a lecture on this topic tonight at Cass Business School, hosted by City University and The New Frontiers Foundation

Constitutia Europeana-continuare-azi parerea "profesorilor"

Jean Monnet Center ne face ca de obicei un pustiu de bine,publicind online o serie de Working Papers dedicate subiectului care ne pasioneaza pe toti (mai ales pe noi romanii, care am stralucit ca de obicei prin neparticipare; pardon, am participat ca bastardul invitat de mila si cu sila la masa "fameliei" care nu s-a mai vazut de ani)

Dar iata mai jos aticolele cu pricina

No. 5/04 Symposium: Altneuland: The EU Constitution in a Contextual Perspective (O Conferinta Organizata de Hauser Global Law School Program, Jean Monnet Center for International and Regional Economic Law & Justice, New York University School of Law impreuna cu Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs la Princeton University la care au participat citeva personalitati ale lumii academice, (vezi gasi articolele lor urmarind linkul din titlu) drintre care citam, la intimplare, pe Neil Walker, Philip Pettit, Andras Sajo, Mark Tushnet, Ran Hirschl, Armin von Bogdandy , Paul Craig....(webmaster-ul site-ului face urmatoriul comentariu pe care il reiau si eu: Armin von Bogdandy, The European Constitution and European Identity: A Critical Analysis of the Convention's Draft Preamble (original version) [We have decided to publish the original paper of Professor Von Bogdandy on the Preamble to the Draft Constitution as presented by the Convention (in addition to his comment on the post IGC Preamble) because of the striking and lasting value of his comments on the Original Preamble. We did not want this remarkable piece of scholarship lost.]

No. 6/04 Matej Avbelj, European Court of Justice and the Question of Value Choices: Fundamental human rights as an exception to the freedom of movement of goods

No. 7/04 Olivier de Schutter, The Implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights through the Open Method of Coordination

Thursday, November 18, 2004

Curtea Europeana a Drepturilor Omului-update

Vazind si eu ca romanul prima decizie a curtii privitoare la Albania, mi-am adus aminte de bancurile de pe timpul lui nenea Ceasca privitoare la armata lor si plin de curiozitate, am vrut sa vad cu ce Dumnezeu au putut veni si astia in fata curtii. Surpriza a fost pe masura, pentru ca speta este interesanta (si seamana al naibii de mult cu spete romanesti asemanatoare care pot ajunge cindva in fata curtii), si impreuna cu ea sint inca citeva spete (veti vedea situatii de fapt destul de asemnatoare celor romanesti)potential interesante penrtu noi, astfel ca astazi fac o exceptie la capitolul de mai sus si "public" aproape integral un comunicat al grefei in care nu sint spete romanesti. Dar iata mai jos despre ce e vorba (din pacate iar nu am timp sa traduc, dar textul unora dintre deciziile de mai jos este accesibil si in franceza direct pe site-ul Curtii)

Qufaj Co. Sh.P.K. v. Albania (application no 54268/00)-Violation Article 6 § 1

The applicant is an Albanian company established in 1992. Following the refusal of the Municipality of Tirana to grant a building permit for land which the applicant had purchased from the Municipality and in respect of which it had obtained planning permission, the company instituted proceedings in the District Court seeking compensation in an amount of 60,000,000 leks (ALL). Its claim was dismissed, but it appealed successfully. In a judgment of 23 February 1996, which became final and enforceable, the Tirana Court of Appeal awarded the applicant the ALL 60,000,000 it had claimed.

The applicant took various steps to secure enforcement of the Court of Appeal’s judgment, in vain. Ultimately it brought proceedings in the Constitutional Court, which found that the enforcement of court decisions lay outside its jurisdiction.

Before the European Court of Human Rights, the applicant company alleged, in particular, that the failure of the Albanian authorities to comply with a final decision had infringed Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The Court reiterated that execution of a judgment given by any court had to be regarded as an integral part of the “trial” for the purposes of Article 6. It was not open to a State authority to cite lack of funds as an excuse for not honouring a judgment debt. Admittedly, a delay in the execution of a judgment might be justified in particular circumstances. But the delay could not be such as to impair the essence of the right protected under Article 6 § 1.

In the case under review, in order to secure compliance with the judgment of the Tirana Court of Appeal, the applicant company had been obliged to resort to the relevant enforcement proceedings and had subsequently lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court. In the latter connection the Court expressed the view that the Constitutional Court
was competent to deal with the applicant company’s complaint as part of its jurisdiction to secure the right to a fair trial.

At the material time the reason advanced by the national authorities for their failure to comply with the judgment had been that they were experiencing financial difficulties. However, the applicant company should not have been prevented from benefiting from the judgment in its favour on such grounds.

In its first judgment in a case concerning Albania, the Court accordingly held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights and awarded the applicant company 60,000,000 leks (ALL) (the amount determined by the Tirana Court of Appeal), 70,000 Euros (EUR) for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and EUR 2,000 for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in English.)

Fotopoulou v. Greece (no. 66725/01) Violation Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
Violation Article 13

The applicant, Aikaterina Fotopoulou, is a Greek national. She is the owner of a house at the place called “Karavostasi” on the island of Folegandros (Greece).

In 1988 a presidential decree designated Karavostasi as a “traditional village” and imposed specific conditions and building restrictions in order to preserve its character. Neighbours of the applicant, who owned a house which was originally a covered shelter where a fisherman kept his boat, began building work without planning permission. This involved building a 2.5-metre-high wall on 80-centimetre-high foundations.

The applicant, whose view of the sea was restricted by this wall, complained about the works to the local police. On 30 March 1993 the commission for the investigation of illegal construction decided that the wall should be demolished, and in May 1994 the governor of the Cyclades region granted a sum of money for the demolition work. On 22 October 1996 the Minister of the Environment and Regional Planning dismissed an appeal by Mrs Fotopoulou’s neighbours and noted that the demolition decision was final.

On 22 June 2002 the Supreme Administrative Court
dismissed an appeal by Mrs Fotopoulou’s neighbours against the annulment of the planning permission they had obtained in the meantime.

The applicant complained of an infringement of her right to peaceful enjoyment of her possessions, and of the lack of a remedy whereby she could challenge the administrative authorities’ failure to demolish an illegally erected building opposite her house. She relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (protection of property) and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy).

The Court noted that the demolition decision taken by the commission for the investigation of illegal construction had become final with the decision of the Minister of the Environment. The administrative authorities had therefore been under an obligation to demolish the wall, but had made no attempt to do so. Moreover, the judgment given by the
Supreme Administrative Court
in 2002 had explicitly recognised that the wall in issue had been declared illegal “definitively” and that it should therefore be demolished.

The circumstances of the case showed that the administrative authorities’ refusal or failure to demolish the wall complained of, for a long period and without any good reason, had no legal basis under domestic law. The Court therefore held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

As to the remedies available to the applicant in the face of the administrative authorities’ inertia, the Court noted that the Government had referred only to actions that could be brought against the applicant’s neighbours, not against the defaulting authorities. Even supposing that the outcome of such remedies might have been favourable to the applicant, they could not be regarded as effective for the purposes of the Convention because to set them in motion the applicant would have had to undertake fresh proceedings against the administrative authorities in question. Consequently, in the absence of remedies whereby the applicant could obtain demolition of the wall in question, the Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.

Under Article 41 of the Convention (just satisfaction), the Court awarded Mrs Fotopoulou EUR 19, 823 for pecuniary damage, EUR 5,000 for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 13,864 for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in French.)

Papastavrou and Others v. Greece (no. 46372/99)
Just satisfaction

The applicants are 25 Greek nationals. They had been involved in a long-standing dispute with the Greek State about ownership of a piece of land in Omorphokklisia, Galatsi, included in a larger property known as the “Veikou estate” which the State had expropriated between 1923 and 1941. They alleged a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) in that their property had been expropriated de facto without any financial compensation.

In a judgment of 10 April 2003 the European Court of Human Rights held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It further held that the question of Article 41 (just satisfaction) was not yet ready for decision.

In the judgment it gave today the Court decided unanimously to award the applicants jointly EUR 250,000 EUR for pecuniary damage. (The judgment is available only in English.)

Zazanis and Others v. Greece (no. 68138/01)
Violation Article 6 § 1
Violation Article 13

The applicants, Aristomenis Zazanis, Maria Sampson and Leonidas Zazanis, are Greek nationals. They owned a piece of land in Loutraki, which was designated as building land in the town’s development plan in 1971 and was entered in the land register as forest land in 1982.

In 1992 the applicants signed a contract with a construction company to have a building several storeys high erected on their land. In July 1993 the company was granted planning permission, which was annulled by the Supreme Administrative Court in 1997 on the ground that the company had not obtained prior permission to cut down trees on the land. The company made a number of applications to that effect but permission was refused, notably on the ground that not all the relevant documents had been submitted.

The company appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court
, which held in a judgment of 17 August 2002 that all the necessary documents had been submitted and referred the matter to the administrative authorities for a decision on the application for permission to cut down the trees. In spite of that judgment, Loutraki District Council asked the company to fulfil conditions that were not laid down in the relevant legislation and reduced by half the proportion of the land on which building was permitted.

In February 2003 the Ministry of the Environment classified the land as “parkland”.

The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing) and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the Convention of the authorities’ refusal to comply with the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgment of 17 August 2002 quashing the decision to refuse planning permission in respect of land owned by them.

Following the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgment of 17 August 2002, the administrative authorities should have reconsidered their position on whether to grant permission to cut down trees, in accordance with the rules applicable at the time. Instead, they had asked the company to submit further documents and had added a new condition, requiring the applicants and the company to accept a different construction coefficient from that applied in the town itself. The Court considered that the fact that the town-planning department had laid down those new conditions amounted to a refusal to comply with the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgment.

Furthermore, the reclassification of the land as “parkland” by the Ministry of the Environment three years after the
Supreme Administrative Court’s judgment amounted to a formal expropriation order rendering the judgment devoid of purpose. In addition, there was no evidence that the authorities actually intended to expropriate the land in question, since no steps had been taken to compensate the applicants. The Court accordingly held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1.

Having examined, in particular, the remedies referred to by the Government, the Court considered that there had been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention in the present case on account of the absence of a domestic remedy whereby the applicants could have obtained the enforcement of the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgment.

Under Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awarded the applicants jointly EUR 30,000 for non-pecuniary damage. (The judgment is available only in French.)

Pravednaya v. Russia (no. 69529/01) Violation Article 6 § 1
Violation Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

The applicant, Lidiya Andreyevna Pravednaya, is a Russian national who was born in 1936 and lives in Novosibirsk. She has been in receipt of an old-age pension since 1991.

The applicant applied to the Russian courts to contest the manner in which her pension was to be recalculated. The Zayeltsovskiy District Court found in her favour on 21 October 1999 and its judgment was upheld on appeal. The pension-fund agency in question appealed, requesting reconsideration of the District Court’s judgment on account of the discovery of new circumstances, namely an instruction by the Ministry of Labour and Social Development. In a judgment that contained no reference to the instruction, the appellate court upheld the District Court’s judgment.

In August 2000 the agency submitted a further application for reconsideration of the judgment of 21 October 1999 on account of the discovery of new circumstances. After a fresh examination of the case on 12 February 2001 the District Court, applying the instruction in question, dismissed the applicant’s claim.

Relying on Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing) and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property), the applicant alleged, in particular, that in their reexamination of a judgment given in her favour, the judicial authorities had abused the procedure for reconsidering judgments on the discovery of new evidence.

The Court noted that the agency had first requested the re-examination of the case in January 2000. Since the appellate court’s judgment had not contained any reference to the instruction, there was nothing to suggest that the agency had relied on it. Accordingly, the agency’s second request to reopen the proceedings had essentially been an attempt to submit new arguments on points which it had apparently forgotten to raise on appeal. The Court therefore considered that the agency’s request had been an “appeal in disguise”.

In granting the agency’s request, the District Court had infringed the principle of legal certainty and the applicant’s right to a court. The Court therefore held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1.

The Court further considered that by depriving the applicant of the right to receive a pension in an amount determined in a final judgment, the State had upset the fair balance that had to be struck between the interests at stake. It accordingly held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. (The judgment is available only in English.)

Prokopovich v. Russia (no. 58255/00) Violation Article 8

The applicant, Margarita Semenovna Prokopovich, is a Russian national, who was born in 1940 and lives in Vladivostok.

In 1988 the applicant and her partner moved into a flat together. They never married, but from 1988 onwards they lived together as husband and wife. The applicant however kept her residence registration at her old address. In August 1998, while the applicant was staying in their country cottage, her partner died in the flat. The applicant only learnt of his death two days later, when he had already been buried in the presence of his son and his two sisters.

On 2 September 1998 the applicant filed a request with the housing maintenance authority to be given an occupation certificate for the flat. Her request was refused because on 1 September 1998 an occupation certificate had already been issued to the head of the local police department who was also the hierarchical superior of her deceased partner’s son.

On 4 September 1998, on returning to the flat, the applicant found that the door had been broken open and that books and other household items were being loaded onto a lorry. Once the removal was completed, the applicant was told to vacate the premises immediately. When she refused to comply with the request, she was thrown out of the flat by force. The door was replaced and she was not given keys.

The applicant unsuccessfully sought to institute criminal proceedings against, among others, the new occupier of the flat. At the same time she filed a civil action against the Vladivostok City Council and the new occupier. The District Court dismissed her action, finding in particular that her residence was of a temporary nature. Statements provided by five neighbours to the effect that she and her partner had maintained a joint household were held not to be sufficient evidence. This judgment was subsequently confirmed by the
Primorskiy Regional Court. The applicant’s requests for supervisory review were rejected.

The applicant complained under Article 8 (right to respect for family life) of the Convention that her eviction from her late partner’s flat had been unlawful.

Having regard to the co-existence of convincing, concordant and unrebutted factual circumstances, the Court found that the applicant had sufficient and continuing links with her partner’s flat for it to be considered her “home” for the purposes of Article 8 of the Convention.

The applicant’s eviction from the contested flat by State officials had constituted an interference with her right to respect for her home by a public authority. For such interference to be permitted under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention it had, among other things, to be “in accordance with the law”. Yet Article 90 of the relevant Housing Code permitted eviction only on the grounds established by law and only on the basis of a court order. That provision introduced an important procedural safeguard against arbitrary evictions and its wording permitted no exceptions. The Government had moreover conceded that the procedure established by Article 90 of the Housing Code should have been followed in the applicant’s case, even though her residence had not been legally established. The Court could not discern any circumstances that could have justified in this case a departure from the normal procedure of eviction and the remarkably hasty re-allocation of the flat to a police officer just seven days after the death of the former tenant.

It followed that the applicant’s eviction could not be considered to have been “in accordance with the law”.

The European Court of Human Rights accordingly held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention and awarded the applicant EUR 6,120 for non-pecuniary damage and for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in English.)

Wasserman v. Russia (no. 15021/02)
Violation Article 6 § 1
Violation Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

The applicant, Kim Wasserman, is an Israeli national, who was born in 1926 and lives in Ashdod, Israel.

On a visit to Russia in 1998 the customs authorities fined the applicant an amount equal to the sum of 1,600 US dollars which had he had omitted to declare. The applicant lodged a civil action in the Khostinskiy District Court of Sochi, which found in his favour and ordered the Treasury to repay the amount forfeited in roubles. This judgment was upheld on appeal. Following representations by the applicant and further proceedings, the District Court ordered the Federal Treasury in February 2001 to transfer USD 1,600 to the applicant’s bank account in Israel. This decision was not appealed and became final on 1 March 2001. Subsequently the applicant made several complaints about the non-enforcement of the judgment and in 2003 brought a civil action against the competent office of court bailiffs. Those proceedings are still pending.

The applicant complained that the respondent State failed to enforce a final judicial decision in his favour and that the failure to honour a judgment debt interfered with his property rights. He claimed a breach of Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing) of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) to the Convention.

As regards Article 6 § 1, the Court noted the Government’s admission that the writ of execution had been lost in the process of its transfer from the Moscow bailiffs to the Sochi office. However, the logistical difficulties experienced by the State enforcement services could not serve as an excuse for not honouring a judgment debt. The respondent Government had not provided any explanation as to why the applicant’s complaints about non-enforcement of the judgment had not prompted the competent authorities to investigate the matter and to ensure that the enforcement proceedings were brought to successful completion. By failing for years to take the necessary measures to comply with the final judicial decision in the present case, the Russian authorities had deprived the provisions of Article 6 § 1 of all useful effect.

As regards Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court found that the decision of February 2001 provided the applicant with an enforceable claim, namely to have the amount of USD 1,600 credited to his bank account in Israel. But the applicant had not received from the State the judgment debt as soon as it became enforceable or even within the time-limit set in the domestic law. Enforcement proceedings had been instituted and subsequently abandoned due to the loss of the writ of execution within the machinery of the court bailiffs’ service. The impossibility for the applicant to have the judgment enforced had constituted an interference with his right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, for which the Government had failed to advance any plausible justification.

The Court accordingly held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and awarded the applicant EUR 300 for pecuniary damage, EUR 3,600 for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 600 for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in English.)

Curtea Europeana de Justitie - Nu exista protectie legala pentru bazele de date usor realizate

Un caz deosebit de interesant a fost decis de catre Curtea Europeana de Justitie recent referitor la faptul daca un program de curse de cai beneficieaza de protectia oferita unei baze de date.

Curtea Europeana de Justitie a decis sa diminueze protectia legala a bazelor de date "spin-off"(usor realizate sau derivate) conform Directivei 1996/9/EC privind bazele de date.Pentru a primi o protectie "sui generis" a bazei de date o investitie substantiala trebuie facuta in " cautarea, colectarea, verificare si prezentarea materialelor existente"

Curte a decis ca " Obtinerea, verificarea sau prezentarea continutului unei liste de meciuri de fotbal sau a unui program de curse de cai nu constituie investitie substantiala ce da dreptul la o protectie a bazei de date impotriva utilizarii sale de catre terte parti"

Stire preluata din EDRI-Gram nr 2.22

Decizia Curtii - British Horseracing Board v William Hill (09.11.2004)

Vezi si

Press release Curia verdict in cases C-46/02, C-203/02, C-338/02 andC-444/02 (09.11.2004)

EDRI-gram 2.15 'Opinion European Court of Justice: perpetual rights fordatabases' (04.08.2004)

Din nou despre "starea" justitiei-vazuta din interior

Dupa surpriza placuta a mesajului unui judecator pe care l-am publicat recent pe blog, iata inca o surpriza placuta; parerea unui alt judecator despre ce este si cum se poate imbunatati justitia romana.
Nu stiu ce parere au altii despre aceste lucruri, dar eu unul am categoric impresia ca avem citiva judecatori mai buni decit meritam, si in mod cert mai buni decit merita onor ministerul care se ocupa de ei. Sa speram fac aceste mesaje vor stirni un curent de opinie favorabil schimbarii de care avem atita nevoie.

Cele de mai jos sint preluate dintr-un Articol apărut în săptămânalul DILEMA VECHE, aprilie 2004(sublinierile imi apartin).

Dinăuntru- din viaţa unui judecător care aşteaptă reforma -

Nu este foarte dificil să faci o radiografie a sistemului judiciar. Noi, cei care lucrăm înăuntru, ştim cel mai bine problemele acestuia. Dar fie nu avem timp, fie nu avem curaj să o facem, fie ne-am convins deja că nimeni nu-i interesat de soarta lucrătorilor din justiţie. "Aveţi salarii mari, ce vă mai trebuie?!", ni se replică. Am impresia că intenţia celor cu putere de decizie politică este de a ascunde toate neregulile sau chiar a nega existenţa acestora, pentru a închide odată nenorocitul de capitol 24 de negocieri. Vom mai vedea noi pe urmă...
Noroc însă că sînt foarte mulţi tineri intraţi în sistem după 1989, o parte din miile de absolvenţi scoşi pe bandă în fiecare an de facultăţile de drept - adevărate vînzătoare de iluzii, interesate doar de cîştig, nu de buna pregătire a studenţilor şi de cerinţele pieţei. Dar sîntem printre cei mai bine pregătiţi în domeniu. Mulţi însă trăim adevărate dezamăgiri: aproape toţi am intrat în justiţie pentru că într-adevăr ne-a plăcut această funcţie; nu pentru bani sau putere, ci pentru "acel ceva" pe care l-am putea defini ca "vocaţie, chemare".

Ajungem însă să fim dezgustaţi de ceea ce este în interior. Mulţi dintre cei cu ani buni de experienţă gîndesc deja că nu se mai poate schimba nimic; ei nu au nevoie de complicaţii, ei au încetat să mai lupte şi aşteaptă pensia. Unii, mai îndrăzneţi, părăsesc magistratura şi trec în notariat sau avocatură. Cu mulţi te întîlneşti apoi şi afli că unii au onorarii de mii de euro şi că le merge excelent. Iar tu aştepţi chenzina ca să-ţi poţi plăti chiria şi întreţinerea la bloc, gazul-curentul-cablul-telefonul, grădiniţa copilului, taxa pentru studiile postuniversitare pe care te chinui să le faci ca să ai ce să mai adaugi în C.V., rata la bancă şi, desigur, împrumuturile de la rude pe care, cu toată ruşinea, a trebuit să le faci luna trecută. Unii sînt şefi toată viaţa lor; alţii descoperă că nimeni "acolo sus" nu-i iubeşte. Cine are curajul să ridice deschis anumite probleme primeşte stigmatul de "rebel" şi fie este taxat la notele date la sfîrşit de an, fie nu primeşte aviz de la şefi pentru a participa la concursurile de promovare, fie, dacă a primit totuşi acest aviz şi a luat gradul superior, i se refuză transferul la instanţa corespunzătoare.

Arătăm ca nişte zombi
Pentru cei mai mulţi, în special pentru cei care lucrează în instanţele mari, e foarte greu. Am ajuns să arătăm ca nişte zombi: oboseala cronică şi bolile profesionale le întîlnim în cazul fiecăruia dintre noi. Majoritatea avem ulcer din cauza stresului profesional, purtăm ochelari şi sîntem plini de eczeme sau facem alergie la praful de pe dosare. Pe nimeni nu interesează şi nimeni nu este responsabil. Sînt colegi grav bolnavi, unii chiar de cancer în formă avansată, care vin la serviciu pentru că ar pierde la salariu dacă ar rămîne în concediu. Sînt colegi care leşină la locul de muncă şi sînt luaţi cu Salvarea. Sînt magistraţi care consultă în mod regulat psihologi; sînt unii care chiar au contractat boli psihice şi au părăsit sistemul. Rezişti sau pleci, căci are cine te înlocui.
În ziua cînd ai şedinţă de judecată, îţi vine să plîngi: de fiecare dată numărul de dosare de soluţionat este mai mare. La statistici nici nu ar trebui să fii întrebat cîte cauze ai pe rol, ci cîţi metri cubi de dosare. În sală, o mulţime de cauze te împiedică să judeci: poştaşul nu a dus citaţiile la părţi sau martori; dacă aceştia le-au primit şi nu vor să vină, ar trebui să-i amendezi, dar degeaba o faci, că nişte norme de la Administraţia Financiară spun că ai nevoie de toate datele de identificare plus C.N.P. (de unde să le obţii, dacă ei au lipsit?!); dacă dai ordin poliţistului să îi aducă cu mandat de aducere, din lipsa personalului acesta se rezumă doar la a-i pune să semneze un proces-verbal de înştiinţare, întocmai ca şi poştaşul; procesomanii ştiu deja modalităţile de a te face să amîni cauza cel puţin de 5 ori consecutiv. Te întîlneşti cu vreo parte care, cu lacrimi în ochi, se declară mulţumită pentru hotărîrea dată, în timp ce altul năvăleşte în biroul tău, nepăzit de nimeni, şi te ia la bătaie, ori te trezeşti cu el în sala de judecată unde te acuză de faţă cu toţi că eşti corupt.
Unde nu există personal auxiliar suficient, magistraţii îşi aduc computerele de acasă şi îşi dactilografiază singuri hotărîrile. Nu există un număr suficient de robe, aşa că le împrumutăm unii de la alţii. Nu avem legitimaţii.
Zilele trecute m-a sunat o colegă de la o instanţă dintr-un oraş mic ca să mă întrebe ce s-a mai modificat în procedura ......, că ei nu au cum să se informeze. Eu însumi am lucrat cîţiva ani într-o judecătorie unde nu exista legislaţie dinainte de 1994 şi trebuia să merg la primărie pentru a face rost de Monitoare Oficiale mai vechi. Iar unde lucrez acum, ministerul a livrat doar două Coduri de procedură penală - ediţia oficială, în condiţiile în care în instanţă sîntem 30 de judecători..... din cele două coduri, unul a fost dat şefului, iar celălalt s-a pus la păstrare, ca nu cumva noi, ceilalţi, să ne certăm... "Faceţi justiţie!" - nu contează cum.
Totul trebuie făcut rapid, cu "celeritate"; ce contează este "să stăm bine la statistica de sfîrşit de an". Imaginaţi-vă, chiar ni se spune fără nici o reţinere să intuim (?!) soluţia şi să soluţionăm cît mai repede cauzele, să nu le ţinem mult pe rol, ca - vezi, Doamne - justiţiabilii să nu facă reclamaţii pe la ministere sau instituţii internaţionale cum că procesul ar dura prea mult... Altfel se declanşează vreun control şi cine ştie ce se poate descoperi. Tuturor ne este frică de controale. Dar nimeni nu se gîndeşte că scopul acestora nu trebuie să fie timorarea magistratului sau găsirea de "noduri în papură" pentru a-i închide gura "rebelului", ci semnalarea eventualelor greşeli, pentru a-l ajuta ca pe viitor să fie mai atent.E frustrant că nu mai avem timp să mergem în bibliotecă să citim ultimele apariţii legislative (şi pe an apar 2.000 de acte normative!), manuale sau reviste de specialitate. Dar tot timpul ni se cere o "bună pregătire profesională şi calitate a hotărîrilor". Interesant este că în politica ministerială se prevede necesitatea unei pregătiri continue prin Institutul Naţional al Magistraturii, dar seminariile durează doar 2-3 zile şi sînt obligatoriu de urmat... o dată la 5 ani. Dacă accesezi programul legislativ şi cauţi hotărîrile CEDO contra României, nu vei găsi vreuna. De asemenea, nu sîntem informaţi despre activitatea şi hotărîrile Consiliului Superior al Magistraturii, unde lucrează "reprezentanţii" noştri. La o recentă adunare a liderilor filialelor Asociaţiei Magistraţilor din România, unde s-au întîlnit reprezentanţi a 30 de judeţe, la întrebarea cîţi dintre cei prezenţi cunosc ce fac aleşii noştri în CSM, doar 5 au ridicat mîna. Justiţia e izolată. Sîntem o putere? - nici nu intră în discuţie.
Am văzut politicieni vorbind de problemele din justiţie: că sînt, că se rezolvă, că multe provin din fosta guvernare, că Europa nu cunoaşte chiar exact situaţia de aici... Nimic mai fals: nu am auzit un singur ales al poporului să spună concret care sînt acele probleme şi cum se pot ele rezolva. Iar că Europa nu ar cunoaşte situaţia de aici, asta e complet eronat. Ar trebui să afle cei "de sus" că sistemul judiciar din România a fost evaluat de un grup de magistraţi care au întocmit un raport pe care l-au trimis în luna februarie 2004 la Bruxelles, semnalînd disfuncţionalităţile din sistem şi paşii greşiţi în reforma "de formă" a justiţiei. Acest raport l-am dat publicităţii pe 11.02.2004 de faţă cu reprezentanţi ai Parlamentului, ONG-urilor, presei, ambasadelor şi ai Delegaţiei Comisiei Europene la Bucureşti. Ei bine, nimeni de la Ministerul Justiţiei nu a catadicsit să vină. Ei, cei din minister, nu se coboară la nivelul nostru...
Mai mult, în timp ce eu citeam la Bucureşti părţi din acel document, doamna ex-ministru se afla la Cluj, la şedinţa de Bilanţ pe anul 2003 a Curţii de Apel. Şi în momentul în care am afirmat că sînt magistraţi în ţară care se plîng că sînt supravegheaţi de serviciile secrete, că telefoanele le sînt ascultate, că le este interceptată corespondenţa, doamna a primit un bileţel de la cel care a însoţit-o în vizită, după care a izbucnit faţă de colegii mei: cum de îndrăzneşte un judecător .... să facă o asemenea declaraţie?! De unde izbucnirea doamnei, cînd de fapt ar fi trebuit să se declare îngrijorată de o asemenea afirmaţie şi să ceară verificări, informaţii? Măcar de ochii lumii. Cînd m-am întors ....., colegii m-au apostrofat: "S-a supărat doamna ministru de cele spuse de tine. Toţi ştim că e adevărat ce ai zis, dar ştii că nu putem dovedi!". Ca să completez tabloul, săptămîna trecută am stat de vorbă cu o doamnă magistrat care, la sfîrşitul discuţiei, a început să meşterească ceva pe masă; atunci am realizat că îşi monta acumulatorul înapoi în telefon; telefoanele mobile nu pot fi ascultate cît timp cele două corpuri sînt separate... No comment. Nu există justiţie independentă dacă magistraţii nu se simt independenţi.

Nu e ca în filmele americane
Şi mai este pînă să fim şi să ne simţim independenţi. Dacă dă nenorocul peste tine să judeci cauze implicîndu-i pe mai-marii locali, atunci e atunci. Cine zice că nu se gîndeşte la eventualele consecinţe în cazul în care vreunul este nemulţumit minte. Şi nu spun mai mult.
Cetăţenii se plîng de justiţie, dar majoritatea nu au un minim de cunoştinţe juridice. Cei care nu au intrat niciodată într-o sală de judecată sînt surprinşi că nu purtăm perucă, nu avem ciocănel şi nu există juraţi, ca în filmele americane. Cei care intră însă în sediul unei instanţe habar nu au ce trebuie să facă, încotro să o apuce. Nu este nimeni care să-i îndrume; nu există un simplu ghid informativ în acest sens. Cu puţină educaţie juridică, ei nu s-ar mai lăsa fraieriţi de avocaţi care le cer onorarii de 10% din suma pretinsă, fără a elibera chitanţă (vă daţi seama ce înseamnă aceasta la un simplu partaj pentru un apartament, care ridică la suma de un miliard de lei?); unii mai au tupeul de a susţine că o parte din sumă va fi dată judecătorului, pe care pretind că îl cunosc foarte bine. În fine, ar şti ce să facă după ce rămîne definitivă o hotărîre civilă pe care ai pronunţat-o în favoarea lui şi nu s-ar mai lăsa înduioşat de executorul judecătoresc care îi spune că foarte greu se poate intra în posesia bunurilor de executat ori că îi este frică să înceapă executarea din cauza "spatelui" pe care îl are partea ce a pierdut procesul, făcîndu-l pe amărît să avanseze alte sume de bani... neimpozabile.
Respect? Pe culoare trecem printre oameni care nici nu se sinchisesc de noi. Pe vremuri, povestesc bătrînii, judecătorul mergea pe stradă însoţit de un poliţist şi trecătorii se dădeau la o parte din faţa lui. E drept, nici noi nu ne respectăm. Sînt o jignire atenţia şi servilismul care i se arată unui ministru cînd vizitează vreo instanţă. Şi noi facem parte, ca şi el, din una dintre cele trei puteri în stat, dar cînd mergem la Guvern sau la Parlament nici nu sîntem băgaţi în seamă. De cîte ori nu ni se întîmplă să mergem la Ministerul Justiţiei şi să nu putem intra din cauza unui simplu subofiţer de la poartă? Sau atunci cînd mergem în minister pentru a da examene, cîţi dintre noi nu au cunoscut umilinţa aşteptării pe holuri ore întregi, fără să ne întrebe nimeni nimic, sub privirile arogante al funcţionarilor care treceau ţanţoşi pe lîngă noi?...
Care reformă, deci?! Justiţia ar trebui să fie responsabilă, eficientă şi independentă. Dar deocamdată, aceste noţiuni ţin de domeniul S.F.-ului. Dacă lucrurile vor continua astfel, mulţi dintre noi vom părăsi sistemul.

Felicitari lui Cristi, autorul acestui articol pentru cele de mai sus.
Any comments?

Idei contemporane-U. Mich. Law & Ec. Working Paper Series

Aaron S. Edlin (bepress)anunta citeva noi articole in seria University of Michigan John M. Olin Center for Law & Economics Working Paper Series,din care publicam mai jos citeva "for the record".

EDITOR: Omri Ben-Shahar, Professor of Law and Economics,
University of Michigan

Laura N. Beny, "Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary Comparative Evidence" (November 16, 2004).
University of Michigan Legal Working Paper Series. University of Michigan John M. Olin Center for Law & Economics Working Paper Series. Working Paper 35.

Despite the longstanding insider trading debate, there is little empirical research on insider trading laws, especially in a comparative context. The article attempts to fill that gap. I find that countries with more prohibitive insider trading laws have more diffuse equity ownership, more accurate stock prices, and more liquid stock markets. These findings are generally robust to controlling for measures of disclosure and enforceability and suggest that formal insider trading laws (especially their deterrent components)matter to stock market development.
The article suggests further avenues of empirical research on the specific mechanisms through which insider trading laws might matter and the political economy of their adoption.

Kai-Uwe Kuhn, "Economic Theories of Bundling and their Policy Implications in Abuse Cases: An Assessment in Light of the Mircrosoft Case" (September 1, 2004). University of Michigan Legal Working Paper Series. University of Michigan John M. Olin Center for Law & Economics Working Paper Series. Working Paper 33.

Omri Ben-Shahar, "An Ex-Ante View of the Battle of the Forms: Inducing Parties to Draft Reasonable Terms" (October 1, 2004). University of Michigan Legal Working Paper Series. University of Michigan John M. Olin Center for Law & Economics Working Paper Series. Working Paper 32.

This paper focuses on one type of ex-ante effect of the battle of the forms: the incentive to draft reasonable boilerplate terms. It argues that the experience with the battle-of-the-forms rule under the CISG reinforces what we already know, that existing legal solutions do not provide any incentive for the parties to draft reasonable forms.
The paper suggests that the goal of inducing parties to draft reasonable terms can be significantly promoted by a third rule, a variant of the "best-shot" rule proposed by Victor Goldberg. Under the version labeled the "reasonable-shot" rule, the court would resolve the battle of the forms by choosing the form that contains the more efficient terms. The paper proposes some guidelines how the "reasonable shot" could be identified by the court, and argues that there are good reasons to expect that this regime would give parties the incentive to draft reasonable terms. In fact, it is plausible that under this rule the parties' forms would converge and the battle of the forms would cease to exist.

Oren Gazal, "Screening, Plea Bargains and the Innocent Problem" (November 4, 2004). University of Michigan Legal Working Paper Series. University of Michigan John M. Olin Center for Law & Economics Working Paper Series. Working Paper 31.

Courts in common law countries reject plea-agreements only when the agreed upon sentence is seen as exceedingly lenient. This judicial intervention is designed to ensure that plea-bargaining does not undermine deterrence. Many legal scholars argue against this policy, claiming that courts should prohibit plea-bargaining all together. They argue that the plea-bargaining system increases the risk of wrongful convictions. Economists often criticize this judicial intervention as well, but for a different reason.
Rather than advocating the abolition of plea-bargaining, many economists argue that the courts should accept all plea-agreements without review. They claim that plea-bargaining can help ensure an efficient use of prosecutorial resources and thus help maximize deterrence.
In the paper, I will argue that a plea-bargaining system that includes judicial review is superior to both of these suggested alternatives. Moreover, I will show that the prohibition of exceedingly lenient sentences is justified, not because it ensures appropriate deterrence, but because it can reduce the risk of wrongful convictions. When the evidence against a certain defendant is weak, the prosecution is usually willing to offer him a lower sentence in plea-bargaining in order to ensure his conviction. Such a defendant would not accept an offer to plead guilty unless he receives a substantial concession in the agreement. Thus lenient plea-bargaining can indicate that the evidence against the defendant is weak. Given that weak evidence can indicate a higher probability of factual innocence, it is likely that the percentage of innocent defendants is relatively higher among defendants that are offered an exceptionally lenient plea-bargains. When courts prevent these types of agreements, they force the prosecutor either to go to trial or to dismiss the case. At the same time, the court would accept plea-bargains in strong cases because in these cases, prosecutors can achieve defendants' agreements to settle even without offering them exceedingly lenient concessions. By hindering the prosecutor's ability to agree to exceedingly lenient sentences, courts increase the cost of handling weak cases, without obstructing the prosecutor's ability to settle stronger cases. This helps to reduce the risk of wrongful convictions by encouraging the prosecutor to pursue the cases of defendants that are more likely to be guilty and to dismiss the cases against defendants that more likely to be innocent.

Oren Gazal and Oren Bar-Gill, "Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty" (November 1, 2004). University of Michigan Legal Working Paper Series. University of Michigan John M. Olin Center for Law & Economics Working Paper Series. Working Paper 30.

A major concern with plea bargains is that innocent defendants will be induced to plead guilty. This paper argues that the law can address this concern by providing prosecutors with incentives to select cases in which the probability of guilt is high. By restricting the permissible sentence reduction in a plea bargain the law can preclude plea bargains in cases where the probability of conviction is low (L cases). The prosecutor will therefore be forced to (1) select fewer L cases and proceed to trial with these cases; or (2) select more cases with a higher probability of conviction (H cases) that can be concluded via a less-costly plea bargain. As long as the probability of conviction is positively correlated with the probability of guilt, this selection-of-cases effect implies a reduced number of innocent defendants that accept plea bargains. We argue that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in fact achieve, albeit inadvertently, this socially desirable selection effect. We further argue that more limited discretion in sentencing facilitates the selection-of-cases effect. In this respect, the Federal Guidelines are superior to some of the state-level guidelines that leave considerable room for discretion in sentencing.


Monday, November 15, 2004

Alegeri 2004: doua scenarii propuse de SAR

SAR considera ca sunt doar doua scenarii probabile cu privire la rezultatele alegerilor din noiembrie 2004 din Romania.

Societatea Academica din Romania (SAR : ) este o organizatie grup de reflexie (think-tank) care s-a remarcat prin atitudinea critica fata de guvernare si prin politicile alternative pe care le propune. SAR impreuna cu alte organizatii neguvernamentale au publicat recent listele pentru un Parlament curat, prin care au demascat o serie de politicieni care nu ar avea ce sa caute pe listele de viitori parlamentari.

SAR propune doua scenarii pentru alegerile din 28 noiembrie 2004:

A. Alegerile sunt castigate de Alianta D.A., primarul Bucurestiului, Basescu, devine presedinte si guvernul este format de cei doi membri ai Aliantei, liberalii si democratii, cu sprijinul parlamentar (si, posibil, participarea executiva) a UDMR. In acest caz, vom asista probabil la accelerarea refomelor in primul an-an si jumatate.
Administratia publica, justitia si institutiile abilitate sa aplice legea vor dobandi mai multa independenta - nu neaparat pentru ca noii conducatori sunt perfecti din punct de vedere moral, ci mai degraba pentru ca relatiile informale existente intre clasa politica si grupuri interesate de obtinerea de avantaje personale pe de o parte si pe de alta parte in administratie si justitie, vor fi dezradacinate de alternanta la putere.

Traian Basescu se va implica in lupta impotriva coruptiei, dar se vor vedea curand limitele instrumentelor dezvoltate in ultimii doi ani. Provocarile pentru guvernul Aliantei D.A ar putea veni de la (i) existenta unei puternice opozitii unite rosu-bruna alcatuita din PSD si PRM; (ii) coabitarea dintre cele doua formatiuni componente, Liberalii si Democratii (desi lucrurile ar trebui sa fie mai simple de aceasta data cu numai doi parteneri), si din presiunile diferitelor grupuri de interese proprii, dornice sa ia locul celor PSD-iste in accesul preferential la fondurile publice.

Liberalii sunt in special mai expusi unor astfel de presiuni, datorita cresterii semnificative din ultimul an a cotei lor electorale, mult peste capacitatea organizationala a partidului, ca singuri mostenitori parlamentari ai electoratului de centru-dreapta.

B. PSD castiga, prim-ministrul Nastase devine presedinte, se muta la Palatul Cotroceni si se distanteaza in mare masura de politica interna.

Actualul presedinte Iliescu se intoarce in fruntea partidului de guvernamant si preia controlul efectiv asupra politicii interne, impunand un prim-ministru slab cu un sprijin fragil in partid pentru a putea conduce din umbra. Cum PSD nu va obtine mai mult de 40% din voturi iar sprijinul UDMR nu va mai fi suficient de aceasta data, va fi nevoie de Partidul Romania Mare (PRM).

Certitudinea ca nu se vor alia cu acest partid radical extremist si anti-semit se evapora rapid zilele astea. Ca raspuns la intrebarile oficiale ale ambasadorului american la Bucuresti despre motivele pentru care unul din sindicatele importante a incheiat o intelegere cu PRM, Ministrul Afacerilor Externe, Mircea Geoana, considerat pana de curand drept politicianul PSD cel mai pro-occidental, a reactionat atat oficial cat si neoficial in apararea PRM.

Saptamana trecuta Miron Mitrea, Ministrul Transporturilor si Infrastructurii, spre deosebire de Geoana unul din liderii cu putere reala in partid, a mentionat intr-un interviu acordat presei ca un partid cu cota electorala a PRM nu poate fi ignorat si ca el, personal "il ia in considerare".

Acelasi mesaj a venit din partea lui Octav Cosmanca, un alt decident important. Evident, PSD este pregatit sa deschida usa PRM pentru participare intr-un guvern viitor.

In fond Iliescu este acela care a inspirat si sustinut precedenta alianta rosu-bruna cu PRM din 1995-96. Fiind un politician cu abilitati formidabile, dar un lider slab si oportunist in ce priveste politicile de guvernare, intoarcerea lui la carma partidului va purta amprenta personala inconfundabila: populism, discurs dublu acasa si in strainatate, triangulare intre principalele grupuri de interese economice, manipularea institutiilor si agentiilor publice independente prin plasarea aliatilor la conducerea acestora.

Grupul de persoane pe care Iliescu l-a sustinut de-a lungul timpului, promovandu-l viguros anul acesta pe liste parlamentare, difera in mod evident de managerii publici profesionisti fixati ca obiectiv de aripa Nastase drept "noul PSD"5. Ei sunt mai degraba birocratii cenusii cu competente neclare, dar cu un trecut de colaborare cu diverse servicii de informatii, legati de presedinte printr-o puternica loialitate personala.

Exemplul cel mai ilustrativ este generalul Ioan Talpes, ideolog militar pe timpul lui Ceausescu, apoi sef de serviciu secret dupa 1989, cu legaturi recunoscute cu regimul Milosevici, acuzat de presa ca a supervizat comertul subteran cu combustibil cu Yugoslavia pe timpul embargoului si ca a fost implicat in afaceri cu oficialul NATO acuzat de coruptie, Willem Matser.

La inceputul lui 2004 Iliescu l-a impus pe Talpes, peste capul premierul, ca vice-primministru responsabil cu Justitia si Integrarea europeana.

Saptamana trecuta Talpes a fost din nou pe prima pagina a ziarelor cand l-a invitat pe liderul austriac de extrema dreapta, Jorg Haider, intr-o vizita in Caras Severin, circumscriptia de unde candideaza pentru Parlament.

Pe scurt, Iliescu nu si-a folosit niciodata capitalul politic de necontestat pentru a promova politici coerente sau ca sa lupte cu adevarat impotriva coruptiei. Deci este de asteptat o noua perioada de indecizie si ezitari, similara celeia din 1992-96, cu singura diferenta ca de aceasta data nu ne vom bloca la linia de start ca atunci, ci vom deveni o a doua Sicilie a Europei. Sursele ce sustin cresterea economica vor disparea treptat iar tara va intra iar intr-o era a sanselor pierdute.

Romania va adera intr-un final la UE dar va ramane gaura neagra a Uniunii, cu coruptie generalizata si politici bizantine, greu de inteles de partenerii externi, unde nimic nu este ce pare a fi iar deciziile se iau, nu in urma discutiilor deschise, ci prin negocieri si trocuri informale, in timp ce legea este aplicata in continuare selectiv.

Raportul SAR, integral, nov. 2004: Alegeri 2004 il puteti gasi aici:


Postat aici de Dan STOICA, ll.m.

Sunday, November 14, 2004

Despre programe azi "continuarea" reformei in justitie

Cum nu cred sa pot publica citeva impresii despre cele referitoare la justitie aflate in programele de guvernare ale celor doua formatiuni prinicipale candidate in alegerile de anulul acesta, imi permit totusi sa incep cumva discutia referitoare la justitie prin reluare unui comentariu pe care l-am postat pe lird, in urma declaratiei actualului ministru al justitiei cum ca "Toate hotararile pronuntate vor fi publicate pe site-urile instantelor" reluata de Andrei pe larg aici

"Toate hotararile pronuntate vor fi publicate pe site-urile instantelor" declara prin urmare ministrul nostru, afirmatie pe care o comentez in felul urmator:

Idea aceasta este excelenta. De mult timp aveam nevoie de aceste decizii(printre altele, publicarea acestor decizii are un de unificare al practicii, pe linga acela, la fel de important,ca actorii participanti in sistem-judecatori, avocati, public, stiu la ce sa astepte de la sistem si il anticipa mai bine...Cred ca este inutil sa vorbesc despre cit rau ne face acum "imprevizibilitatea" sistemului)iar pe mine unul parca nici nu ma intereseaza daca Indaco sau altcineva ("outsurcing company", caci in mod clar ministerul sau instantele nu au capacitatea necesara pentru asa ceva) ia bani pentru asemenea publicare, atita timp cit reuseste sa faca un index cu cap si uniform al acestor decizii, in care sa te poti orienta usor. Sint un destul de sceptic privitor la distanta intre intentiile declarate de guvernanti si realizarea lor in practica (m-as fi asteptat sa se spuna cit costa aceasta decizie, de unde se vor lua banii,si mai ales cum va deveni realitate-desi este foarte posibil sa fie vorba doar de o intentie ad hoc a ministrului, care va lua saptamini sau luni bune de dezbatere la minister pina ce va reusi sa fie asternuta cumva si pe hirtie) mai bine zis constanta lor nerealizare, dar sa vedem, simpla declaratie este mai mult decit nimic (pe o scara de la unu la zece dau 2 puncte doar pentru declaratie).

In alta ordine de idei, probabil ca acum (si la fel si in viitor) ne intereseaza doar deciziile Curtii Supreme (CS a inceput sa isi publice partial deciziile pe site-ul sau, dar lista este foarte incompleta), respectiv cele ale Curtilor de
Apel (acum 2 luni, Curtea de Apel Bucuresti avea un site mizerabil, unde nu era publicata nici o decizie) /Tribunale (cind functioneaza ca instante de apel) si cele ale citorva Judecatorii mai "Ocupate", in nici un caz "ale tuturor judecatoriilor". Ca declaratia pare sa cuprinda toate judecatoriile, fara o ierarhie sau concentare asupra a ceea ce conteaza arata inca odata, daca vreti, ca declaratia a fost facuta in pripa, fara vreo idee diriguitoare (alta decit ca ceva trebuie publicat), drept pentru care ii scad, pentru superficialite unul dintre punctele acordate anterior pentru declararea intentiei (Scor pina acum +1)

" Ministerul Justitiei, in colaborare cu ABA-CEELI si un grup de magistrati, a conceput un "Ghid de orientare juridica pentru cetateni", pornind de la realitatea constatata a nivelului extrem de scazut al cunostintelor juridice ale marii majoritati a populatiei."

Constatarea este corecta (unul dintre lucrurile la care romanii se pricep in afara de femei, forbal,birfa, invidie, etc, fiind si dreptul) dar care e titlul: "Ghid de orientare juridica (in dreptul american) pentru cetateni"? Nu de alta, dar cred ca nu era nevoie de ditamai ABA-CEELI sa ii arate onor ministerului cu degetului ce stie orice ins care practica drept prin tribunalele romanesti: ca este foarte greu sa ii explici unui om care nu intelege sub nici o forma sistemul ce se poate face sau nu se poate face in cazul lui.
Per total, notam cu 0 (1 pentru initiativa -1 pentru ca s-a asteptat atit)chestiunea de mai sus.

"Tribunalele comerciale Arges si Cluj au inceput sa functioneze. Pentru anul 2005 se preconizeaza infiintarea unui numar de 18 tribunale comerciale (in 18 judete)."

Chiar sint in Romania 18 judete care intr-adevar fac comert? Eu credeam ca ar fi cel mult vreo 4-5…, si as intelege de ce (eventual) in virtutea traditiei Braila/ Galatiul ar refuza sa mearga la Constanta si ar vrea un tribunal al lor, sau de ce industriile lor falimentare, care ar trebui sa fie
lichidate chiar ar avea nevoie de asemenea tribunale, sau nici macar de tribunale ci de o eventuala sectie specializata in falimente. Vorbind insa despre falimente, probabil ca fiecare judet ar avea nevoie de asa ceva , dar lasind gluma la o parte, chiar avem noi destui judecatori/ personal
specializat pentru asemenea instante(nu mai vorbim aici despre
spatii/tehnica, etc)? Si apropos, exista la nivelul ministerului, o propunere/ buget detaliate si o idée de unde se vor lua banii necesari?

Mult mai firesc mi s-ar fi parut sa se inceapa cu maximum 5-7 tribunale, in care sa ne pregatim judecatorii specializati (si personalul auxiliar) de care avem nevoie, infiintind apoi treptat restul de tribunale de care ar mai fi nevoie in tara.

Pornind de la ipoteza ca un astfel de tribunal are nevoie de macar vreo 5-6 sali de judecata si de un numar de vreo 18-30 de judecatori specializati, la fel de mult cum are nevoie de o arhiva incapatoare, personal auxiliar specializat (modul in care functioneaza arhivele la noi este in prezent inanacceptabil, cu un arhivar doi care nu mai prididesc cu servirea dosarelor cozii lungi, care nu se mai termina si nu are nici un fel de "ordine", cu dosare care zac pe te miri unde si sint tinute vraiste, cu nimeni care sa introduca datele din dosar in calculatoarele care nu exista-sistemul de arhivare/prelucrare a dosarelor este de altfel total primitiv) pe care eu unul il vad cel putin triplu fata de al judecatorilor, pentru o functionare cit de cit normala a acestor instante, etc, iar lucrurile acestea costa bani, si cum banii sint putini, cred ca este mai bine sa incepi cu mai putine lucruri, pe care eventual sa le poti face bine, decit cu mai multe, pe care sa le faci prost. Este drept ca intodeauna sint oameni care eventual asteapta sa fie promovati ca judecatori la astfel de instante, iar 18 judecatorii pot satisface mai bine o astfel de presiune "electorala" decit 5, dar de ce sa nu facem bine macar de data aceasta ceva (daca tot vrem sa facem) ci sa facem ca de obicei, ceva prost?
Punctaj general la initiativa de mai sus(1 pentru initiativa, -1 pentru multitudinea instantelor si lipsa unui plan sau buget)=0

"De la 1 ianuarie 2005 va exista functia de manager de instanta."

He,he, asta e cea mai buna si tare pina acum. Ce e aia managar? Cei care dau tircoale meseriei juridice de suficienta vreme isi mai amintesc legea managarilor data cu pompa prin '93, parca. Isi mai amintesc si
cum a fost "implementata", cu vechii directori copiind ca porcii unul de la altul la asa zisul examen de confirmare pe postul nou, si falimentele care au urmat confirmarii "specialistilor" vechi pe postul nou.

Fara explicatii suplimentare despre ce este acest nou
post, ce face managarul de instanta si cui si mai ales cum da el socoteala, inclin sa cred ca va fi
un loc bunicel si caldut pentru nepotii, matusile, unchii catei si pisicile barosanilor din instante/barouri/ ministere, prefecturi, etc. De ce am avea nevoie cu adevarat ar fi mai mult personal auxiliar, care sa si faca treaba pe la arhive, etc., si eventual de asa zisii law "clerk-i"(daca e sa copiem modelul american), un fel de judecatori asistenti care sa pregateasca cercetarea juridica si elementele dosarului (revazind cu aceasta ocazie si argumentele avocatilor justitiabililor si cercetarea juridica pe care se intemeiaza aceste argumente) pentru judecatori.Eventual acestia ar putea servi drept "secretari" sau managari (desi functia de secretar o poate indeplini ca si pina acum grefierul, mult mai calificat pentru aceasta)de instanta.

Unde ar fi nevoie de un managar, sau un asa zis "functionar al curtii" (al intregii curti)? Ar fi la personalul auxiliar. El ar supraveghea indepliniriea sarcinilor de servici de catre acest personal, ar stabili fisa posturilor samd, lasind presedintele curtii sa se ocupe exclusiv de activitatea judecatoreasca. In nici un caz nu ar avea de a face managagarul cu judecatorii.
Punctaj total pentru idea asta -1 (dat fiind ca nu ni se explica deloc ce este, de unde vine si cui foloseste managarul)
"Se prefigureaza reorganizarea judecatoriilor, prin transformarea a 48 de judecatorii mici in "sedii secundare" ale altor judecatorii cu un volum mai mare de activitate. Aceste "sedii secundare" vor avea activitate redusa (o sedinta la doua saptamani) si personal redus (1- 2 judecatori)."

O asemenea judecatorie la care nu pot sa nu ma gindesc imediat citind cele de mai sus este cea de la Giurgiu( asa cum arata acum vreo 7 ani cind am vazut-o ultima oara.)
Girgiuvenii pot veni cu certitudine la Bucuresti, si avind in vedere cum arata acum citiva ani Curtea de acolo, care nici macar sediu secundar nu putea fi numita o asemenea mutare isi are rostul.
Singurul neajuns ar fi acela ca daca restringem drastic o asemenea curte/curti renuntam astfel la un mod atit de util de a promova magistrati...
Punctaj total +1 (mai mult functie de "implementare")

"Instantele sunt informatizate in proportie de 60% (3200 de computere)."

Avind in vedere e-mail-ul judecatorului, pe care l-am publicat recent pe acest blog cred ca domnul ministru a avut in vedere a) anumite instante ori b) computerele aduse de acasa de catre judecatori, sau si mai rau c)ne minte direct si pe fata.
Pina nu vom avea o proba directa la dispozitie (unde sint computerele acestea, cite, etc), punctaj total mai sus -1

"In cel mai scurt timp, toate instantele vor beneficia de echipamente pentru ca repartizarea cauzelor in complete de judecata sa se faca in sistem informatizat, in mod aleatoriu, pentru inlaturarea oricaror suspiciuni cu privire la obiectivitatea acestei activitati."

"In cel mai scurt timp" este un termen prea vag pentru a-l lua in serios. Adica la calende, dupa calendarul romanesc?
Puncaj mai sus 0.

"Pana in anul 2007 fiecare magistrat va fi dotat cu computer cu acces la legislatie si Internet.Tot pana in anul 2007 toate hotararile pronuntate vor fi publicate pe
site-urile instantelor."

In sfirsit un termen...As fi preferat sa stim citi judecatori vor fi dotati (aici avem deja 60% care au, conform declaratiei de mai sus, deci e vorba doar de 40%, nu?)/cite hotariri vor fi publicate in 2004/2005/2006..., desi poate fi vorba doar de o declaratie pentru UE-sa fim noi acceptati in decembrie, ca pe urma avem inca 2 ani sa facem vreun plan.
Punctaj aici 0=pentru lipsa detaliilor

Totalul meu la cele de mai sus =1. Le astept pe ale voastre.

Iar invingatorul este....partea a treia

Cum doresc de ceva timp sa inchei thread-ul acesta (si nu mai apuc sa o fac a) din istoria contemporana a Americii si a lumii cu (doar) iata citeva mesaje (din cele enorm de multe discutii care s-au desfasurat de o saptamina incoace pe aceasta tema) care cred ce reflecta mai mult sau mai putin esenta a ceea ce este de spus(din pacate nu am avut timp sa le traduc, asa cum as fi dorit).

Inainte de acestea insa, o analiza in superba si in adincime a campaniei electorale (care concluzioneaza ca: ei, saracii natiunii au cistigat alegerile pentru bogatii natiunii) o gasiti aici

Trecind la mesaje, unul al lui Matthew Iglesias, de miercurea trecuta ne avertizeaza impotriva optiunii optimiste:

I would caution anyone against deluding themselves into believing that a second Bush term won't be so bad. With a majority of the popular vote and expanded margins in the House and Senate, we're going to see Bush Unleashed -- something that will probably be much crazier than what we've seen over the past four years

Si inca unul, postat de acelasi autor vinerea trecuta :

One good consequence of Bush's reelection is that it will allow us, to some extent, to empirically test some theoretical propositions about international relations. In particular, now that the American people have chosen to continue with Bush, and Bush is determined not to change course in foreign policy, what will the reaction of other major countries be.

What we've seen over the past four years has, arguably, not been dispositive. Bush struck out on a path that, while not without precedent in American history, was pretty fundamentally at odds with the direction of US national security policy since we began providing assistance to the British Empire during World War II. The rest of the world's population has reacted to this with varying degrees of hostility, but other governments have reacted with a more-or-less "wait and see" attitude, wanting to see whether Bush would be rejected at the polls (and in the case of France and Germany, arguably trying to subtly influence the election outcome) or else would signal a change of course in his second term. It now seems clear that this will not happen, and that the characteristic approaches of Bushism -- an effort to unleash American power from the bonds of international law, maintain military hegemony throughout the world, establish a two-tiered system of national sovereignty, etc. -- will be the characteristic approach of the USA. The Democrats in 2004 seemed inclined to reverse this course, but not to challenge its theoretical underpinnings publicly, and if they persist in this strategy (as it seems they will) they are unlikely to be able to truly reverse it simply be regaining the presidency in four or eight years time, even if they remain viable as a national political entity.

The bulk of neoconservative opinion will have it that the consequence of this should be a "bandwagon effect." Most major foreign countries stayed aloof from the United States over the past three years because they hoped that Bush would be defeated or cowed into changing course, and they could get the liberal internationalism they preferred. Now that Bush -- and the American people -- have demonstrated their resolve to "stay the course," however, other powers will give up on this game and accept that they need to play within the rules of the new game. Many neoconservatives thought such an effect would be in evidence immediately after the Fall of Baghdad, and that anti-war countries would come begging for scraps (reconstruction contracts, etc.) at the table of American hegemony. It didn't really happen, but it might happen in the future. On this account, it's either America's way or the highway, and there's no point to sticking on the highway, so with the exception of a few eccentric rogue states (North Korea, Iran, etc.) other people with get with the program even if they don't really care for the program.

Realist theory tells us something rather different. On this account, now that it's clear the US tends to try and maintain an imperial, rather than a liberal, form of global hegemony, other powers are going to need to try and check us. In the short term, of course, no other country can come even close to matching US military power. The current engagement in Iraq, however, has radically reduced America's practical ability to project power to anywhere outside the immediate vicinity of the Persian Gulf, our technological edge notwithstanding. Meanwhile, there are signs that other powers are upgrading their ability to project power in their immediate neighborhoods. China is increasing defense spending (albeit from a low base) even faster than the USA. The European defense integration project, though much doubted when first proposed, is, in fact, moving forward, albeit slowly. Meanwhile, the EU is expanding, and it appears that Turkey is committed to moving toward Europe and away from the US and Israel. None of this demonstrates an actual ability to check the United States with military force, or even a real capacity to act independently of the USA in a non-trivial way (though France already has some ability to do this, and Turkey can locally) in the short term, but it does indicate the seeds of an intention to proclaim liberal hegemony dead and challenge the emerging imperial paradigm.

In the immediate future, though, checking tendencies would need to be manifest in non-military venues. The easiest place to do this is in the major international organizations -- most notably the UN -- where the rules mandate a level of great power equality that is not justified by the underlying military realities. Stéphanie Giry writing in The New Republic argues that China is doing just this in Africa, acting as a proxy for the interests of African regimes on the Security Council in exchange for concessions on local issues of importance to China. Since the US level of strategic interest in Africa is low, we demonstrate a much higher propensity to abide by UN dictates there, and this strategy is effective. As we saw in early 2003, when it comes to an area where the US government feels major interests are at stake, we prefer ignoring the UN to allowing its rules to be used as a checking mechanism. Insofar as other countries try and use the UN this way, the natural Bushian response will be further denigration of the UN, and such action will confirm the neoconservative belief that international law is basically a scam by which Lilliputians can tie down the USA. This, in turn, will reinforce the belief abroad that the liberal order is dying and that capacity to check the United States in non-UN ways must be enhanced.

If this shows up anywhere, it should be in the realm of economics. The European Union is already an international trade behemoth that can -- as we saw during the steel tarrifs fracas -- bend the US to its will on certain select issues. Ostensibly what happened there was that WTO rulings made Bush back down, but as we've seen elsewhere, Bush is happy to ignore the rulings of international bodies when doing so suits him. What made the difference here was that Europe had a credible threat to back up the WTO ruling with a cleverly-designed series of tarrifs aimed at maximizing the pain in states that are important in the electoral college. One may see further uses of this European trade power to try and influence the behavior of America and other countries. China is not nearly as economically large as the EU at this point, but it has a lot of potential debt- and currency-related leverage over the US. The conventional wisdom has it that this is a mutually assured destruction sort of situation where China can't credibly threaten to pull the trigger, but it's possible that a clever government could find a way. Japanese economic power combines European and Chinese forms of leverage, though each to a lesser extent. Japan also seems set to continue along the path toward substantial remilitarization that it's been on for the past several years.

Maybe all of this will come to nothing and, in the end, the neoconservatives will prove right and foreign powers will accommodate themselves to US hegemony. To some extent, at least, Russia and India seem content to try this path for now. Will it hold up in the long run?

In sfirsit, tot vinerea trecuta Brad de Long reia un comentari al the New Republic (comentariul este redat mai jos integral):

The New Republic tells us what it thinks of the Republicans' latest legislative "achievement":

The New Republic Online: Priceless:
There is a simple way to understand economic policy-making under George W. Bush: Whichever pressure group has the strongest and most direct stake in an issue gets its way. Wealthy individuals and business owners have received large tax cuts; farmers have gotten lavish assistance; and insurance and drug companies won enormous subsidies in the Medicare prescription-drug bill. When steel firms lobbied for tariffs, Bush granted them. When automakers and other manufacturers later lobbied Bush to reverse course, complaining that those tariffs had raised the cost of the steel they buy, he began to back down. If there's a single prominent case where Bush offended a powerful corporate interest--except to benefit an even more powerful corporate interest--we have not come across it.

It is therefore fitting that the final bill Bush has signed before voters have a chance to cast judgment on his term represents the apotheosis of this appalling tendency. With no public ceremony at all, Bush last week approved a grotesque and completely indefensible corporate tax bill. If anybody needs a final reminder of this administration's lack of concern for the national interest--indeed, the lack of a policy process that could even conceivably advance it--this is it.

The latest installment of this revolting saga began in March, when the European Union began imposing new tariffs as retaliation for the U.S. refusal to repeal a $5 billion per year export subsidy that the World Trade Organization said violated fair trade practices. This prompted Congress to rescind the subsidy. So far, so good. Then, predictably, Congress decided that the savings from killing the subsidy could not be used to reduce the deficit. Instead, the money had to go to tax breaks. And, rather than using the money for broad-based tax breaks, Congress decided on specific tax breaks for manufacturers. Why is this dumb? Because economists across the political spectrum have long held that, if the government rewards one kind of economic activity over another, it distorts the economy. Worse, those who don't qualify for preferential treatment will press the government to be reclassified.

That's exactly what happened. First, Congress redefined "manufacturing" to include engineering contractors (under pressure from Bechtel), companies involved in mineral extraction (for the benefit of Exxon Mobil), and virtually anybody else who hired a lobbyist. Later, the pretense of helping manufacturers was dropped entirely, and everybody from the importers of Chinese-made ceiling fans to foreign citizens who earn money gambling on American dogs and horses won special provisions. One lobbyist involved in drafting the bill confessed to The Washington Post that the whole thing represented "a new level of sleaze." In the end, the breaks given out will substantially exceed the cost of the rescinded subsidy, driving the deficit even higher.

There is plenty of blame to go around. The GOP-run Congress utterly abdicated its responsibilities by allowing the bill to degenerate into a lobbying free-for-all. Only a few Democrats bothered to put up a fight, with most deciding it was best to hop aboard the gravy train themselves. Louisiana Democratic Senator John Breaux gave voice to unprincipled capitulation when he told The New York Times, "In the end, you need to get things done." (Breaux is retiring and reportedly entertaining lucrative offers to work as a lobbyist.) And John Kerry inexplicably failed to campaign against the bill, eliminating any pressure to oppose it.

But the ultimate responsibility lies with the Bush administration. It is in Congress's nature to act like a pig at the trough. The reason this sort of spectacle is so rare is that most presidents have some sense of responsibility to the national interest. Conservatives, liberals, and moderates have all denounced this bill. (Conservatives recognize the "tax breaks" to be thinly disguised pork.) It is a naked payoff, and there's no principled reason, from any ideological perspective, to support it.

That's why it is so emblematic of Bush's presidency. Previous presidents have done things that have alienated conservatives or moderates or liberals. But is there any president in recent memory who has enacted major legislation that is universally regarded, excepting its direct beneficiaries, as bad public policy? If so, there certainly can't be one who, like Bush, has done so over and over again. (We're referring here to the farm subsidies, the Medicare bill, and other giveaways listed above.) Some endorsements of Bush have expressed hope that, in a prospective second term, he will either moderate his views or hew more firmly to conservative principles. Both possibilities would constitute an improvement. Neither, alas, would be remotely plausible.

Iar in incheiere, un cuvint plin de inginare al celor care au pierdut...

Diferite programe

Pentru ca politicienii nostri sa nu mai ramina repetenti si dupa alegerile acestea, sau sa aiba un "mandat general" care Dumnezeu stie ce contine, cum are nenea George sau cum au avut ei pina acum, e bine sa ne mai uitam din cind in cind si pe ce spun domnii politicieni cu mina pe inima (si cu gindul la "bozunar"-ul propriu) ca vor sa faca. Din pacate "uitatul" asta ia timp, si efort intelectual, doua lucruri pe care oamenii in general, si romanul in special nu prea este dispus sa le risipeasca pentru asemenea "materii" frivole, astfel incit, desi caut de vreo ora si ceva ceva expuneri sistematice pe marginea temelor de mai sus, nu reusesc sa dau decit peste fragmente (orice informatie care contrazice afirmatia de mai sus e binevenita). Astfel ca, inspirat de comunicatul de mai jos, m-am gindit ca nu ar fi rau sa arunc o privire pe programele diferitelor partide, si in special ale celor care au sanse reale de a cistiga partea leului la alegerile care bat la usa, asa, ca sa stiu la ce sa ma astept in viitorii 4 ani. Ma voi uita in principal peste capitolul justitie (una dintre "realizarile" care intirzie finalizarea negocierilor cu EU, dar nu exclud si alte capitole, astfel ca eventualele comentarii ale unor economisti, etc., sau indicatii despre unde se afla aceste comentarii pe net vor fi mai mult decit binevenite).

Pentru inceput, programul PSD se gaseste aici, in timp ce platforma de guvernare a aliantei PNL-PD poate fi gasita aici

In contiuare, iata "deschiderea" comentariilor celor doua programe, comunicatul despre care vorbeam mai sus( 20 Octombrie)

Prima evaluare independenta a programelor PSD-PUR si PNL-PD


La cererea revistei Dilema veche, un grup de experti independenti au evaluat programele de guvernare ale PSD+PUR si PNL-PD. Vestea buna este ca ambele formatiuni au trecut clasa, obtinind note peste 5, pe o scala de la 1 la 10. Vestea proasta este ca ambele programe sint mai curind mediocre, desi opozitia inregistreaza un usor avantaj. Media finala a PSD+PUR este 5,48, iar cea a PNL-PD 6,06.

Selectiuni comparative din programe, impreuna cu evaluarile si comentariile expertilor vor aparea in suplimentul special editat de Dilema veche cu aceasta ocazie, vineri (22 octombrie). Suplimentul este ilustrat de caricaturile lui Ion Barbu, deschis de consideratiile lui Andrei Plesu si postfatat de opiniile lui Mircea Dinescu.

Proiectul “Eu pentru ce votez?” a fost dezvoltat de Dilema veche in parteneriat cu agentia de stiri europene Experti romani cu experienta in evaluarea politicilor publice (vezi prezentarea expertilor mai jos) au evaluat propunerile celor doua forte politice in ce priveste


Fiecare tema a fost evaluata tinind cont de urmatoarele criterii:
1. Impact pe termen scurt;
2. Posibilitati de implementare;
3. Costuri politice/Sustinere politica;
4. Efecte pe termen mediu si lung;
5. Potential reformator pentru societate;
6. Apreciere generala asupra programului (gasiti mai jos detalii pentru fiecare dintre aceste criterii).

Va prezentam mediile notelor acrodate de experti, pe capitole:

Impozitare: PSD+PUR – 6,3; PNL-PD – 7,3

Coruptie: PSD+PUR – 3,8; PNL-PD – 5,1

Educatie : PSD+PUR – 5,2; PNL-PD – 6,8

Mediu/Agricultua: PSD+PUR – 5,9; PNL-PD – 5,4

Pensii: PSD+PUR – 5,3; PNL-PD – 5,3

Sanatate: PSD+PUR – 6,4; PNL-PD – 6,5

Din concluziile suplimentului:

Cele mai mari note s-au inregistrat la capitolul ”Impozite”: PSD+PUR – 6,3; D.A – 7,3. Ambii combatanti propun reduceri semnificative ale impozitelor pe venit si profit, ca si a contributiilor pe salarii. Fiscal, programele se delimiteaza totusi: Alianta D.A. propune o reducere apreciata de experti ca indrazneata, cu efect imediat, dar si cu o doza de imprevizibil; pe de alta parte, PSD-PUR adopta politica ”pasilor marunti”. Desi expertii au notat per total pozitiv ideea unei taxe cu cota unica, au fost semnalate posibile forme de opozitie fata de aceasta idee, care ar putea duce la abandonarea sa (criteriul 4 de evaluare).

Singura corigenta inregistrata (nota sub 5) a fost cea a PSD+PUR la “Coruptie” – 3,8. Expertii au considerat ca metodele propuse pentru lupta impotriva coruptiei sint insuficiente pentru gradul de raspindire a fenomenului. In cazul D.A., aceasta a trecut clasa la limita (5,1). Cea mai mare diferenta intre cele doua programe s-a inregistrat la capitolul ”Educatie”: PSD+PUR – 5,2 fata de 6,8 ceilalti. Expertii au considerat ca opozitia vine cu o strategie credibila la nivel macro pentru acest domeniu, iar puterea se limiteaza la proiecte disparate. Expertii au gasit ambele programe pe agricultura ca fiind aproape egal de proaste, amindoua incercind sa ”inece probleme in bani”, aruncind pe piata promisiunilor subventii, abordind doar timid alte mijloace moderne de interventie. Alianta D.A nu si-a facut temele la capitolul mediu. Aceasta parte din capitolul Mediu/Agricultura a facut diferenta si a propulsat PSD+PUR pe primul loc la acest capitol cu 5,9, fata de 5,4 pentru D.A. Expertul specializat a considerat ca opozitia propune reglementari care sint deja adoptate.



Sorin Ionita (director executiv al Societatii Academice din Romania):

”Ambele formatiuni propun o reducere per total a impozitarii: PSD una mai mica, insotita de mai multa redistributie sociala; Alianta are un program mai neoliberal. Probleme: tinte nerealiste in cazul PSD (salariul minim brut de 160 de euro este urias; finantarea altor masuri generoase daca se reduce impozitarea in cazul Aliantei (ex. rentele viagere).”

Andrei Postelnicu (jurnalist la Financial Times)

”Propunerea Aliantei DA de a adopta o cota unica a impozitului pe venit si pe profit poate fi o oportunitate pentru a incuraja cresterea economica a Romaniei intr-un mod fara precedent. Din motive greu de inteles, PSD-ul refuza sa accepte efectele pozitive demonstrabile pe care un regim fiscal simplu le-a avut in alte economii ale zonei, respectiv Rusia si Slovacia”.

Constatin Rudnitchi (jurnalist economic, redactor-sef Bilant)

”Anticipez ca daca D.A. va cistiga alegerile va avea de infruntat o opozitie puternica, pentru ca in acest moment marea masa a contribuabililor, sub influenta PSD, crede ca o cota unica de impozitare ar fi dezavantajoasa. Dar, daca exista vointa politica...”


Marian Preda (director executiv al Centrului de Studii Europene in domeniul Politicilor Sociale si Ocuparii Fortei de Munca):

”Promisiunile de 100 de euro pensie medie (PSD + PUR) si 110 (PNL + PD) au evident caracter electoral si, in contextul celorlalti parametrii promisi, nu pot fi realizate. Conform calculelor noastre, fara finantare de la bugetul de stat, cu o rata de colectare de 80% si cu un raport intre pensionari si contributori de 1,35 pensionari/salariati-contributori si cu rata de contributie 0,315 din venitul mediu brut, pensia medie ajunge la 18,7% din acest venit. In functie de venitul mediu brut se pot face simulari. De exemplu la 200 de euro, pensia ar fi de aproximativ 37,4 euro. Pentru o pensie medie de 100 de euro, venitul ar trebui sa fie de aproximativ 535 de euro. La salariile de 310 – 350 de euro promise de aceste programe, pensia medie poate fi de 58–65 de euro. Desigur, se poate imbunatati rata de colectare si poate creste numarul de salariati–contributori (pe termen lung), dar aceste cifre ar putea mari pensia cu maxim 40 – 50% spre 87 – 98 de euro.”


Alexandru Crisan (Profesor de Politici Educationale Comparate la Columbia University - Teachers College (New York)/ director executiv al Centrului Educatia 2000+, organizatie specializata in politici de educatie):

”PSD+PUR propun, mai degraba, o colectie de micro-programe razlete, iar nu jaloanele unei politici educationale coerente, sistemice si durabile. Lipsa unei viziuni globale si confuzia grava dintre politicile sectoriale necesare si ineficientele "masuri" conjuncturale vor duce – in cazul castigarii alegerilor – la pierderea si a urmatorilor patru ani cu sterile "cautari", care vor tine loc unor politici pe termen lung, aplicate consecvent”


Codru Vrabie (expert al Transparency International - Romania)

”Nu ma impresioneaza deloc tratamentul prescris, fiindca diferente de esenta nu exista intre "aspirina saracului", piramidon si paracetamol, atunci cind ar trebui sa vindeci un cancer. Solutiile propuse de ofertele electorale ale PSD+PUR si PNL-PD pentru combaterea coruptiei demonstreaza o cunoastere superficiala a problemei si o incercare disperata de rezolvare "dupa ureche”.


Cristian Vladescu – (presedintele Centrului pentru Politici si Servicii de Sanatate): “Ambele programe atribuie un rol marcant echitatii in domeniul sanitar; totusi in programul Aliantei D.A. un accent mai mare este pus pe libertatea de alegere (prin sistemul de informare a pacientilor despre competenta si performanta medicilor, promovarea platii diferentiate a cadrelor medicale in functie de performanta). Dimensiunea sociala este mai puternic reprezentata in programul PDSR (accent sporit pe serviciile din mediul rural, centre medico-sociale etc.). Mediul rural se regaseste ca preocupare in ambele programe, ca si alte aspecte precum cresterea accesului la medicamentele compensate, sporirea rolului asistentei primare, imbunatatirea serviciilor de urgenta, dezvoltarea ingrijirilor pentru virstnici si asistentei la domiciliu.”


Lucian Luca (cercetator principal la Institutul de Economie Agrara, expert al Bancii Mondiale pentru agricultura si dezvoltare rurala):

”Impresia de seriozitate si competenta inspirata de programul Uniunii PSD+PUR, cit si abundenta masurilor populiste, fac sa treaca in plan secundar optiunea strategica a programului: sprijinirea marilor exploatatii agricole de tip firma sau cooperativa. O optiune riscanta social si care lasa loc favorizarii unei anumite clientele. Este meritoriu accentul pus pe sprijinirea investitiilor, cu toate ca in cazul sistemului de irigatii, de exemplu, intentiile sint oarecum fanteziste. Platforma de guvernare a Aliantei D.A. pune accentul, din pacate, pe aceleasi masuri populiste. Totusi enunta explicit obiectivul politicii propuse: transformarea gospodariilor taranesti in ferme familiale comerciale”.


Rodica Stanescu (doctor in chimia protectiei mediului; coordonator al studiilor de impact al transpunerii directivelor de mediu ale UE in Romania):
“Experienta acumulata in elaborarea planurilor de implementare a directivelor de mediu ale UE si asumate de actualul guvern a condus la realizarea unui program de guvernare (al PSD+PUR) cuprinzator, cu obiective generoase privind protectia mediului. Platforma de guvernare a Aliantei PNL-PD acorda un spatiu important mediului, punind accent pe constientizarea si educarea publicului. Din pacate, parcurgind acest capitol ajungem la concluzia ca Alianta D.A. isi propune, printre altele, introducerea de noi reglementari nationale fara a avea cunostinta ca ele deja exista ca urmare a transpunerii directivelor de mediu ale UE”.

Este permisa si ne va face placere publicarea oricaror parti din acest comunicat.

Pentru orice alte detalii, puteti contacta coordonatorii proiectului: Cristian Ghinea – Dilema veche (0723340016) sau Manuela Preoteasa - (0744382952).

Va multumim,

Redactia Dilema veche

Redactor sef: Mircea Vasilescu


Proiectul ”Eu pentru ce votez?” a supus atentiei unui grup de experti propunerile PSD+PUR, respectiv PNL-PD in ce priveste Impozitarea; Pensiile; Educatia; Coruptia; Sanatatea; Mediu/Agricultura. Expertii au notat de la 1 la 10 aceste propuneri, acordind cite o nota pentru fiecare dintre urmatoarele criterii:

1) Impact pe termen scurt (urmarind daca populatia va avea de cistigat prin aplicarea acestor masuri; exista categorii sociale/profesionale care ar putea avea de pierdut; masurile propuse maresc exagerat presiunea pe populatia activa si daca acest risc merita asumat)

2) Posibilitati de implementare (urmarind daca costurile acestor propuneri sint rezonabile; bugetul public suporta aceste costuri; pot sa apara dificultati legate de ratiuni bugetare care ar putea duce la abandonarea propunerilor; partidele au avut in vedere aceste riscuri si au propus contra-masuri rezonabile; impactul acestor masuri va fi limitat de capacitatea administativa (inclusiv arta de a adopta legi bune fara a fi puse in practica)

3) Costuri politice/Sustinere politica (urmarind daca pot sa apara contestatii ce pot duce la abandonarea acestor politici; aceste politici depind de suportul public; exista riscul sa nu fie obtinut acest suport; pot sa apara contestari vehemente din partea opozitiei, a sindicatelor, a presei sau a ONG-urilor; pot fi contestate si sabotate de mediul de afaceri; exista riscul abandonarii acestor masuri din cauza acestor tipuri de opozitie.

4) Efecte pe termen mediu si lung (urmarind daca pot sa apara efecte negative pe termen mediu si lung prin aplicarea acestor masuri; ce anume efecte pot sa apara (ex: dependenta de stat a unor parti din populatie; cresterea periculoasa a datoriei publice; scaderea calitatii anumitor servicii publice; deficitul anumitor fonduri speciale, etc)

5) Potential reformator pentru societate (urmarind daca aceste propuneri corespund unei viziuni de ansamblu privind reformarea politicilor publice; pot sa atraga efecte benefice pe termen mediu si lung pentru schimbarea societatii; pun relatii dintre stat si platitorii de impozite pe alte baze; corespund cu politicile Uniunii Europene in domeniu.

Apreciere generala asupra programului (urmarind in ce masura sint la obiect programele si cit de mult utilizeaza sau nu utilizeaza exprimari quasi-generale, propagandistice, forme goale de continut; daca exista contradictii intre diverse propuneri sau intre obiectivele diverselor proiecte preconizate?


Patru specialisti in economie si politici publice au evaluat toate temele:

Andrei Postelnicu – ziarist in redactia din New York a Financial Times. A colaborat la acest proiect in nume personal.

Sorin Ionita – director executiv la Societatii Academice din Romania, cel mai activ think-tank din Romania. Este specialist si doctorand in politici publice, co-autor al volumului ”Politici Publice – teorie si practica”, Polirom, 2002.

Matei Paun – licentiat in Relatii Internationale la Trinity College, Connecticut, SUA. Inainte de a se intoarce in Romania in 1997, a lucrat pentru compania Firebird Management din New-York, care a lansat unul dintre primele si cele mai prospere fonduri de investitii pentru tarile CSI. La intoarcerea in Romania, a infiintat si condus divizia de operatiuni bancare a companiei REGENT PACIFIC, in domeniul tranzactiilor financiare.

Constatin Rudnitchi – ziarist specializat in domeniul economic, redactor-sef al revistei economice "Bilant", fost redactor-sef adjunct al saptaminalului economic si financiar “Capital”.

Un alt grup de experti a evaluat cite o tema, in functie de specializare:

Pentru politici anti-coruptie: Codru Vrabie – expert in cadrul Transparency International – Romania. Anterior, a absolvit Universitatea Americana din Bulgaria si a lucrat cu American Bar Association, Center for Legal Resources.

Pentru pensii: Marian Preda – doctor in sociologie cu teza ”Politica sociala romaneasca – intre cultura guvernamentala a saraciei si globalizare”; director executiv al “Centrului de Studii Europene in domeniul Politicilor Sociale si Ocuparii Fortei de Munca” din Universitatea Bucuresti, membru al Comisiei Anti-Saracie si de Promovare a Incluziunii Sociale in calitate de specialist. Din lucrarile publicate: ”Politici sociale in Romania: 1990-1998” (coautor), 1998; ”Starea societatii romanesti dupa 10 ani de tranzitie (coautor), 2000; ”Dictionar de politici sociale” (coautor), 2001; ”Politica sociala a Uniunii Europene, 2001”;

Pentru educatie: Alexandru Crisan – analist de politici educationale; Adjunct Profesor de Politici Educationale Comparate la Columbia University - Teachers College (New York). Ca expert independent in politici educationale al Bancii Mondiale, al Bancii Asiatice de Dezvoltare, al Programului Natiunilor Unite pentru Dezvoltare a coordonat si evaluat programe nationale si internationale in peste 15 tari din Europa, Asia si America Latina. Este director executiv al Centrului Educatia 2000+, organizatie specializata in politici de educatie.

Pentru sanatate: Cristian Vladescu – doctor in Sanatate Publica si in Sociologie. Este presedintele Centrului pentru Politici si Servicii de Sanatate din 1999, iar din 2003 este Profesor Universitar, Seful disciplinei de Sanatate Publica a U.M.F. Victor Babes din Timisoara. A participat ca expert la elaborarea de studii si implementarea de proiecte atat pentru autoritatile sanitare din Romania, cat si pentru organizatii internationale precum O.M.S., Banca Mondiala, Uniunea Europeana, Consiliul Europei, USAID s.a.

Pentru agricultura: Lucian Luca – doctorand in economie si cercetator principal la Institutul de Economie Agrara. A lucrat cu Banca Mondiala in calitate de consultant pentru agricultura si dezvoltare rurala si a contribuit la capitolul referitor la agricultura al Memorandumului Economic de Tara (2003). Membru al European Association of Agricultural Economists.

Pentru mediu: Rodica Stanescu – conferentiar la Universitatea Politehnica din Bucuresti si doctor in chimia protectiei mediului. In perioada 1999 – 2004 a urmat stagii de pregatire in domeniul managementului de mediu (UNEP/UNESCO/BMU, Dresda), controlul calitatii in laboratoarele de mediu (Instituto Superior Tecnico, Lisabona) si gestiunii deseurilor (SWECO/SIDA, Stockholm si Zagreb). A absolvit programul “Environmental Leadership” la Universitatea California din Berkeley in 2004. A coordonat realizarea unor studii privind impactul transpunerii directivelor de mediu ale UE in Romania.

Dilema veche

str. Constantin Daniel 11

010631 Bucuresti


tel.: 0040-21-2110769

fax: 0040-21-2113736


Revista "22", ca de obicei comenteaza (pe larg) un program sau altul (desi nu sub forma unei mese rotunde), iar din aceste comentarii am selectat pe cel de aici (voi incerca sa urmaresc/postez saptaminal comentariile lor). De asemeni, la Observatorul Cultural,(mai general) despre Logica democratica romaneasca si despre Reevaluarea structurii partidelor post-decembriste